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Abstract
Laws concerning sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) have undergone a 
sea change. Still, legal protections against SOGI discrimination vary widely around 
the world. As jurisdictions wrestle with whether and how to protect people against 
SOGI discrimination, several conceptual questions emerge. This Brill volume reviews 
and discusses legal developments and scholarly commentary concerning these ques-
tions. Specifically, this volume examines the following five questions: (1) Is SOGI dis-
crimination encompassed by existing laws prohibiting discrimination based on sex? 
(2) Should sexual orientation and gender identity be considered protected categories 
in and of themselves? (3) Is there a standard sequence of steps for developing legal 
protections against SOGI discrimination? (4) What are the drawbacks of developing 
SOGI discrimination protections? (5) To what extent should religious objections justify 
exemptions from SOGI discrimination bans?
Keywords
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 Introduction
Laws concerning sexual orientation1 and gender identity2 (SOGI) have under-
gone a sea change. Many jurisdictions around the world have repealed their 
laws that criminalized same-sex intimacy and expression of diverse gender 
identities. In addition, a growing number of jurisdictions are further reform-
ing their laws to protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) per-
sons against discrimination. Legal regimes at various levels—international, 
regional, national, and subnational—have deemed SOGI discrimination to be 
impermissible in contexts ranging from employment and housing to marriage 
and parenting.3
Developments at the United Nations reflect the globalization of SOGI rights. 
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights has 
made combatting SOGI discrimination a priority, as demonstrated by its “Free 
and Equal” campaign aimed at cultivating SOGI rights.4 Likewise, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council passed a historic resolution in 2016, appoint-
ing the United Nations’ first-ever Independent Expert on protection against 
violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.5
Despite these developments, legal protections around the world remain 
fragmented. In many countries, LGBT persons continue to suffer persecution 
1   This volume adopts the definition of “sexual orientation” found in the Yogyakarta Principles 
in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (Yogyakarta Principles): “Sexual 
orientation is understood to refer to each person’s capacity for profound emotional, af-
fectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a 
different gender or the same gender or more than one gender.” A group of distinguished 
human rights experts launched the Yogyakarta Principles as a non-binding interpretation of 
states’ human rights obligations concerning sexual orientation and gender identity. Although 
human rights treaties do not explicitly address sexual orientation or gender identity, the 
Yogyakarta Principles apply generic treaty provisions to issues concerning sexual orientation 
and gender identity. See Yogyakarta Principles (2007), at 6, and Yogyakarta Principles Plus 
Ten (2017), both available at yogyakartaprinciples.org.
2   According to the Yogyakarta Principles: “Gender identity is understood to refer to each per-
son’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not cor-
respond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may 
involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical 
or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.” 
Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 1, at 6.
3   Dominic McGoldrick, “The Development and Status of Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
under International Human Rights Law,” 16 Human Rights Law Review 613 (2016).
4   See United Nations Human Rights Office, About UN Free & Equal, www.unfe.org/about.
5   United Nations Human Rights Council, Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council on 30 
June 2016, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/32/2.
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and have no legal recourse.6 Countries that do protect against SOGI discrimi-
nation do so to varying degrees and have based their protections on divergent 
legal theories. Indeed, numerous conceptual debates have emerged over the 
course of law reform. This volume provides an overview of how various legal 
institutions and commentators around the world have contributed to these 
debates. With its distillation of these debates, this volume serves as a guide for 
researchers who seek to acquaint themselves with comparative approaches to 
SOGI discrimination law.
This volume proceeds in six steps. Part I lays the groundwork by clarifying 
terminology, scope, and methodology. Parts II and III then examine the de-
bates about how sexual orientation and gender identity fit into discrimination 
law’s framework of protected categories. Some jurisdictions refer to these “pro-
tected categories” as “prohibited grounds of discrimination,” and this volume 
will use the two phrases interchangeably. Part II examines whether SOGI dis-
crimination should be considered sex discrimination and thus be covered by 
existing laws that regard sex as a protected category. Part III then considers 
whether sexual orientation and gender identity should be protected categories 
in and of themselves.
Protections against SOGI discrimination have developed incrementally. Part 
IV examines the nature of this incrementalism. LGBT persons experience dis-
crimination in a range of contexts including the criminal system, employment, 
housing, public accommodations, marriage, and parenting. Governments his-
torically have not reformed their laws to address these various areas all at once. 
Instead, governments tend to expand incrementally the range of contexts in 
which they prohibit SOGI discrimination. Part IV addresses whether there 
is a typical sequence to such incremental law reform. Part IV also examines 
another type of incrementalism: some jurisdictions are leaders in law reform 
and then other jurisdictions follow. This relationship among jurisdictions is 
discussed in Part IV.
The final two Parts of this volume explore the limits of SOGI discrimination 
laws. Part V examines critiques from progressive commentators who believe 
that SOGI nondiscrimination protections have significant drawbacks. Part VI 
then discusses ongoing debates about whether and how SOGI discrimina-
tion bans should include exemptions for religious objectors. The volume then 
6   See, e.g., Vitit Muntarbhorn (as United Nations Independent Expert on protection against 
violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity), “Protection 
Against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,” UN 
Doc. A/72/172 (17 July 2017).
4 Lau
concludes by reflecting on how this volume illuminates the value of studying 
SOGI discrimination law from comparative perspectives.
I Terminology, Scope, and Methodology
This volume uses several terms that are worth explaining. It refers to indi-
viduals with a minority sexual orientation or gender identity through the 
commonly used acronym LGBT, which stands for “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender.”7 In other words, the term “LGBT” describes people who are non-
heterosexual and/or non-cisgender.
One shortcoming of this term is the fact that individuals who have a mi-
nority sexual orientation or gender identity may not self-identify as LGBT. 
Indeed, in some parts of the world, local terminology for SOGI identity catego-
ries captures nuance or fluidity that the LGBT acronym erases; local identity 
labels may also be imbued with cultural significance that is lost when replaced 
by the LGBT acronym.8 For economy of language, however, this volume will 
use the acronym LGBT, which has become commonplace in English-language 
legal literature. It will also use the phrase “SOGI minorities” when emphasizing 
that not all individuals with a minority sexual orientation or gender identity 
identify as LGBT.
One might question why issues of sexual orientation and gender identity are 
discussed in tandem, given that an individual’s sexual orientation and gender 
identity are distinguishable. Indeed, whether someone is lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
or straight is not necessarily related to whether the individual is transgender or 
cisgender. Notwithstanding distinctions between sexual orientation and gen-
der identity, the two are closely linked in culture and politics. Discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on gender identity often 
stem from a shared root: the social policing of gender norms.9 For example, 
in many parts of the world, lesbians and transgender women are both per-
ceived as violating socially constructed expectations about what it means to 
be a woman. Although transgender women breach gender norms through 
their gender identity, and lesbians breach gender norms through their sexual 
7   When speaking specifically about sexual orientation and not gender identity, this volume 
will refer to LGB persons, as opposed to LGBT persons.
8   See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Violence Against LGBTI Persons 
26–27 (2015) (discussing SOGI identity labels, such as “Muxe” in Mexico and “Mati” in 
Suriname, that do not fit neatly within the LGBT acronym); Holning Lau et al., “Assessing 
the Tongzhi Label: Self-Identification and Public Opinion,” 64 Journal of Homosexuality 509 
(2017) (discussing the Chinese term “tongzhi”).
9   This point will be discussed in further detail in Part II.
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orientation, both are perceived as violating norms regarding what it means to 
be a woman.
There is also a long history of coalitional politics among sexual orientation 
and gender identity minorities. To be sure, the strength of LGBT coalitions has 
fluctuated over time and place, but such coalitions have had lasting influence 
on advocacy and law reform.10 For example, the previously mentioned United 
Nations Independent Expert is tasked with working on issues of sexual orien-
tation as well as gender identity.11
Intersex issues also frequently interact with LGBT issues. As LGBT persons 
are targets of discrimination because they breach cultural expectations about 
“manhood” and “womanhood,” prejudice is also directed at intersex persons 
because their bodies do not conform to social expectations for what it means 
to be a man or woman. Accordingly, human rights defenders often consider 
intersex issues alongside LGBT issues. This is reflected in the growing use of 
the acronyms LGBTI (with the “I” standing for “intersex”) and SOGISC (with the 
“SC” standing for “sex characteristics”). Likewise, in 2017 when human rights 
experts updated the Yogyakarta Principles, which were originally a statement 
about LGBT rights, they added recommendations pertaining to intersex rights.12 
Despite the relationship between SOGI discrimination and intersex discrimi-
nation, this volume will focus on SOGI discrimination. Because legal devel-
opments concerning intersex issues are relatively nascent, they warrant fuller 
treatment in a volume of their own.
This volume approaches SOGI discrimination as a general topic, as opposed 
to focusing on discrimination in any specific context such as employment, 
education, or family life. In examining the regulation of discrimination, this 
volume considers law at a variety of levels, from international to national and 
subnational. In doing so, the volume does not seek to provide a comprehen-
sive survey of laws around the world. Instead, it selectively chooses examples 
to illustrate different approaches to developing protections against SOGI dis-
crimination. This volume aims to offer comparative insights on pathways 
for developing protections against SOGI discrimination. Thus, it focuses on 
10   See, e.g., Jena McGill, “SOGI … So What: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Human 
Rights Discourse at the United Nations,” 3 Canadian Journal of Human Rights 1, 23–25 
(2014) (discussing the relationship between sexual orientation and gender identity in in-
ternational human rights advocacy); Shannon Minter, “Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay 
Rights? Getting Real about Transgender Inclusion in the Gay Rights Movement,” 17 New 
York Law School Journal of Human Rights 589 (2000–2001) (discussing the LGBT coalition 
in the United States).
11   United Nations Human Rights Council, supra note 5.
12   Yogyakarta Principles Plus Ten, supra note 1.
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jurisdictions that have in fact developed such protections instead of the juris-
dictions where no such protections exist.
II sogi Discrimination as Sex Discrimination
The legal principle of nondiscrimination does not prohibit all forms of discrimi-
nation. Instead, it dictates that discrimination based on certain grounds—also 
known as protected categories—is presumed impermissible. Sex has long been 
considered a protected category in discrimination law. Human rights treaties 
and a broad range of national laws around the world either state explicitly that 
sex is a protected category or have been interpreted by courts as such.13
A question that continues to be debated is whether SOGI discrimination is a 
form of sex discrimination. This question has been particularly salient in juris-
dictions such as the United States, where Congress has refused to pass legisla-
tion that expressly prohibits SOGI discrimination.14 Because of this legislative 
gap, individuals who have suffered discrimination based on sexual orientation 
or gender identity have sought to persuade courts that the discrimination they 
suffered is prohibited by longstanding bans of sex discrimination.
The remainder of this Part is divided into three sections. First, the following 
section describes legal theories supporting the claim that sexual orientation 
discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. The second section articulates 
legal theories for why gender identity discrimination is a type of sex discrimi-
nation. The third section examines objections to viewing prohibitions of sex 
discrimination as subsuming prohibitions of SOGI discrimination.
13   See, e.g., Mpoki Mwakagali, “International Human Rights Law and Discrimination 
Protections: A Comparison of Regional and National Responses,” 1 Comparative 
Discrimination Law 1 (2017) (discussing numerous international treaties that list sex 
as a protected category); UN Women, Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: 
Constitutional Jurisprudence (2017) (discussing constitutional regulation of sex 
discrimination).
14   Although the US Congress has not passed legislation to ban sexual orientation discrimi-
nation at the federal level, 22 states within the United States and the District of Columbia 
have statutes that prohibit sexual orientation-based employment discrimination. See 
Movement Advancement Project, Non-Discrimination Laws, www.lgbtmap.org/equality-
maps/non_discrimination_laws (data current as of 29 March 2018). The US Supreme 
Court has also interpreted the federal Constitution to prohibit certain forms of sexual 
orientation discrimination, but the Constitution does not apply to private actors, and 
the extent of the Constitution’s protection against sexual orientation discrimination 
in the public sector remains unclear. See Nan D. Hunter, “Interpreting Liberty and 
Equality Through the Lens of Marriage,” 6 California Law Review Circuit 107, 113–114 (2015).
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II.A Sexual Orientation
In the landmark 1994 case of Toonen v. Australia, the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee endorsed the idea that discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation is a form of sex discrimination.15 Gay rights activist Nicholas Toonen 
had challenged the criminal prohibition of homosexual sexual activity in 
Tasmania. The Human Rights Committee held that the law in question violated 
privacy and nondiscrimination rights enshrined in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR lists certain protected cat-
egories. Sexual orientation does not appear on that list, but the ICCPR does 
explicitly name “sex” as a protected category.16 In Toonen, the Human Rights 
Committee stated that “the reference to ‘sex’ [as a prohibited ground of dis-
crimination] … is to be taken as including sexual orientation.”17 Accordingly, 
Tasmania’s law amounted to sex discrimination because it targeted homosex-
ual activity but not heterosexual activity.
Through Toonen, the UN Human Rights Committee became one of a few 
tribunals at the vanguard of accepting the notion that sexual orientation dis-
crimination is a form of sex discrimination.18 The Toonen opinion offered no 
analysis, however, to explain the relationship between sexual orientation and 
sex discrimination.
Subsequent tribunals, as well as scholarly commentary, have gone a long 
way in filling that gap. The United States is an apt case study because it has 
produced a considerably large jurisprudence on this topic. The United States 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has provided one of the 
clearest articulations of the conceptualization of sexual orientation discrimi-
nation being a form of sex discrimination. The EEOC offered this explanation 
in the case of Baldwin v. Foxx.19 David Baldwin was a gay man who worked 
as an air traffic controller at Miami International Airport. He held a tempo-
rary position and was denied a permanent position when it became available. 
Baldwin argued that his supervisor rejected him for the permanent position be-
cause the supervisor disapproved of his sexual orientation. In addressing this 
15   Toonen v. Australia, UN Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (4 April 1994).
16   International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 26.
17   Toonen, supra note 15, at para. 8.6.
18   The UN Human Rights Committee decided Toonen in 1994. The previous year, the Hawaii 
Supreme Court ruled in its landmark same-sex marriage case that sexual orientation 
discrimination is inherently a type of sex discrimination that receives strict scrutiny ac-
cording to the Hawaiian constitution. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64–67 (1993) (plural-
ity opinion). That same year, an appellate court in California held that discrimination 
against a same-sex couple amounted to sex discrimination. Engel v. Worthington, 23 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 329 (Ct. App. 1993).
19   Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (15 July 2015).
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claim, the EEOC needed to determine whether the United States’ federal ban 
on employment discrimination, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title VII), 
prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation. Like the ICCPR, Title VII 
does not explicitly address sexual orientation. It does, however, list sex as a 
protected category.20 Thus, the EEOC needed to evaluate whether the pro-
hibition of sex discrimination subsumes a prohibition of sexual orientation 
discrimination.
The EEOC answered in the affirmative and offered a lengthy explanation 
for why sexual orientation is a type of sex discrimination. This explanation 
can be broken down into two main rationales, which I will call the definitional 
and stereotyping rationales. According to the first rationale, a person’s sexual 
orientation is necessarily defined via reference to the person’s sex.21 Thus, an 
employer who discriminates against an employee based on sexual orientation 
is necessarily treating that employee differently based on sex. Consider the 
example of an employer who punishes a gay man for displaying a photo of 
his boyfriend on his desk, while allowing female colleagues to display photos 
of their boyfriends.22 The employer is discriminating against the gay man be-
cause of his sexual orientation, and his sexual orientation is defined by refer-
ence to his sex. If the employee were not a man, his display of affection toward 
a boyfriend would not have provoked the employer’s ire. In this way, sexual 
orientation discrimination is always a form of sex discrimination.
To further illustrate the definitional rationale, the EEOC drew a compari-
son to earlier race discrimination cases called “associational discrimination” 
cases.23 US courts have held that if an employer discriminates against a white 
employee for being in an interracial relationship, that discrimination amounts 
to racial discrimination. This is so because the employer must take into ac-
count the employee’s race to determine that the employee is in an interracial 
relationship. Likewise, an employer who discriminates against individuals in 
same-sex relationships must take into account an employee’s sex to determine 
whether the employee is in a same-sex relationship. In other words, the em-
ployee’s relationship is defined by reference to the employee’s sex.
The EEOC also explained that discrimination based on sexual orientation 
counts as discrimination based on sex stereotyping.24 According to Title VII 
case law, if an employer treats an employee adversely because the employee 
20   Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e, et seq. (United 
States).
21   Baldwin, supra note 19, at 7–8.
22   Cf. id. at 7.
23   Id. at 8–9.
24   Id. at 9–11.
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failed to conform to sex stereotypes, that adverse treatment would constitute 
sex discrimination. The EEOC explained that the idea that “real men” are at-
tracted to women, and “real women” are attracted to men, is essentially a ste-
reotype. Thus, if an employer rejects an employee for being homosexual, that 
rejection is based on sex stereotypes and amounts to sex discrimination. This 
stereotyping rationale and the definitional rationale coexist; both of them link 
sexual orientation discrimination with sex discrimination.
While Baldwin was a case about employment discrimination, its logic can be 
applied to sexual orientation discrimination in other areas of life, such as edu-
cation and marriage. With that said, the EEOC’s rulings are not binding on US 
courts, and US federal circuit courts are currently split on whether Title VII’s 
ban on sex discrimination subsumes a prohibition of sexual orientation dis-
crimination.25 The US Supreme Court may eventually address this circuit split. 
Courts in the United Kingdom and the European Court of Justice have also 
refused to apply sex discrimination bans to sexual orientation discrimination.26 
Part II.C will examine some of the objections to the argument that sexual 
orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination.
II.B Gender Identity
Courts and government agencies have wrestled with whether discrimination 
based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination. In the United States, 
a sizeable number of courts and administrative agencies have decided that 
gender identity discrimination is in fact a form of sex discrimination;27 how-
ever, the question is not yet completely settled in the United States.28 Some 
courts in Europe and Asia have also endorsed the view that prohibitions of 
sex discrimination encompass gender identity discrimination.29 Drawing on 
25   For cases ruling that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination, 
see Zarda, v. Altitude Express, 883 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2018) (en banc); Hively v. Ivy Tech 
Community College of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). For a case rejecting 
this position, see Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
26   See Macdonald v. Advocate General for Scotland, SLT 1158 (2003); Shirley P. Pearce v. 
Governing Body of Mayfield School, 2001 WL 825287 (Ct. App., 31 July 2001); Regina v. 
Secretary of State for Defence, ex parte Perkins, 1 FLR 491 (1999); Grant v. South-West 
Trains Ltd., All ER 193 (1998); Smith v. Gardner Merchant Ltd., IRLR 342 (1996); Regina v. 
Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith, 4 All ER 427 (1995).
27   See Katie Eyer, “Sex Discrimination Law and LGBT Equality,” ACS Issue Brief, August 2017, 
at 5, n.19 (listing US cases).
28   See id. at 11–12.
29   See National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) v. Union of India, SCC 1 (India 2014); 
P v. S & Cornwall City Council, Case C-13/94 [1996] ECR 1–2143 (ECJ). See also Isabelle 
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illustrative cases from around the world, this section identifies three rationales 
for this view. This volume will refer to them as the stereotyping, transition, and 
categorical rationales.
The stereotyping rationale applies to gender identity much like it applies to 
sexual orientation, as discussed previously. Disapproval of transgender people 
can be understood as disapproval of people who challenge sex stereotypes. For 
example, an employer may perceive a male-to-female transgender individual 
as violating stereotypes about manhood because the individual dresses as a 
woman. Similarly, the employer may also perceive the individual as breaching 
stereotypes about womanhood because the individual is perceived as being 
insufficiently feminine. In this regard, discrimination against transgender in-
dividuals is a form of sex discrimination. In the United States, the EEOC and 
numerous federal appellate courts have adopted this rationale.30 Likewise, in 
a landmark case protecting transgender rights, the Supreme Court of India 
stated that discrimination “for the reason of not being in conformity with ste-
reotypical generalizations of binary genders” constituted sex discrimination.31
Discrimination that targets people who transition from one sex to anoth-
er is also a form of sex discrimination. One US federal court, in the case of 
Schroer v. Billington, explained this by analogizing to religion.32 If an employer 
does not discriminate against Christians or Muslims, but fires an employee for 
converting from Christianity to Islam, that would constitute religious discrimi-
nation under US law. By analogy, even if an employer does not discriminate 
against men or women, the employer discriminates based on sex if the em-
ployer fires an employee for transitioning from being a man to being a woman. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) also seemed to embrace a version of this 
transition rationale. In P v. S and Cornwall City Council, the ECJ held that an 
employer had committed sex discrimination by treating an employee unfavor-
ably because of the employee’s plans to undergo sex reassignment.33 Although 
Chopin & Catharina Germaine, European Commission, A Comparative Analysis of 
Non-discrimination Law in Europe 2017, at 33 (2017) (noting that discrimination laws in 
Austria and the Netherlands treat discrimination against transgender persons as sex 
discrimination).
30   See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District, 858 F.3d 1034, 1047–1051 (7th Cir. 
2017); Dodds v. US Department of Education, 845 F.3d 217, 221 (6th Cir. 2016); Glenn 
v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 
(6th Cir. 2004); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–1203 (9th Cir. 2000); Macy v. 
Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, *7 (EEOC 20 April 2012). But see Etsitty v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007).
31   NaLSA, supra note 29, at para. 59.
32   Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
33   P, supra note 29, at paras. 20–21.
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the ECJ’s opinion was quite short, it suggested that treating an individual unfa-
vorably due the individual’s sex reassignment is inherently sex discrimination.
The categorical rationale is yet another reason for understanding gender 
identity discrimination to be sex discrimination. This rationale recognizes 
the possibility of there being more than two sex categories. Some people 
have a gender identity that does not fit neatly within the male/female binary. 
A non-binary identity can be considered as a sex category beyond the tradi-
tional male/female categories. In this view, discriminating against someone 
for identifying with a non-binary sex category is sex discrimination. As the 
India Supreme Court explained: “The discrimination on the ground of ‘sex’ … 
includes discrimination on the ground of gender identity. The expression ‘sex’ 
used in Articles 15 and 16 [of the Constitution] is not just limited to biologi-
cal sex of male or female, but intended to include people who consider them-
selves to be neither male or female.”34 To be sure, many transgender people 
consider themselves to be male or female, as opposed to identifying with a 
non-binary sex category. Nonetheless, as long as an employer perceives a trans-
gender employee as belonging to a non-binary sex category and discriminates 
against the employee for that reason, such mistreatment would be considered 
sex discrimination according to the categorical rationale.
II.C Objections
There have been several objections to conceptualizing SOGI discrimination as 
forms of sex discrimination. The persuasiveness of these objections may de-
pend on contextual factors that differ from one jurisdiction to another. The 
first objection is that broadening the conceptualization of sex discrimination 
to subsume SOGI discrimination violates the original meaning or purpose 
behind sex discrimination bans.35 From a legal standpoint, the persuasive-
ness of this argument depends on the jurisdiction’s existing framework for 
legal interpretation. For example, we can imagine being in a jurisdiction that 
bans sex discrimination through both constitutional and statutory provisions. 
Additionally, imagine that when those provisions were enacted, no one envi-
sioned the sex discrimination bans being used to combat SOGI discrimination. 
Whether this jurisdiction should now regard SOGI discrimination as sex dis-
crimination depends on the jurisdiction’s approach to constitutional and 
statutory interpretation. If the jurisdiction adheres closely to originalism 
and deems legislative intent determinative, applying the sex discrimination 
34   NaLSA, supra note 29, at para. 59.
35   For examples of cases embracing this objection, see Smith, supra note 26; Ministry of 
Defence, ex parte Smith, supra note 26.
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provision to SOGI claims may well be inappropriate.36 However, in contexts 
like US employment discrimination law, in which the Supreme Court has stat-
ed that Title VII’s coverage is not limited to “the principal evil Congress was 
concerned with when it enacted Title VII,”37 interpreting sex discrimination 
provisions to cover SOGI claims is more fitting.38
Note that, even if SOGI claims were not contemplated when the govern-
ment enacted its sex discrimination ban, doctrines of originalism and legisla-
tive intent do not necessarily preclude SOGI claims. Consider, for example, the 
possibility that sex discrimination legislation was clearly intended to combat 
discrimination based on sex stereotypes. The legislators may not have under-
stood how sex stereotyping gives rise to SOGI discrimination and, therefore, 
may not have contemplated applying their law to SOGI discrimination. Yet, 
if the original intent of the legislation was to combat discrimination based 
on sex stereotypes, the anti-stereotyping principle should logically extend to 
plaintiffs in cases where sex stereotyping caused SOGI discrimination.39
The second objection to regarding SOGI discrimination as sex discrimina-
tion is what I will call the symmetry defense. Consider an employer who refus-
es to hire gay men and lesbians because he disapproves of homosexuality. The 
employer might argue that there is no sex discrimination because he equally 
disapproves of both male homosexuals and female homosexuals. Likewise, he 
may argue that he equally disapproves of both transgender men and transgen-
der women. This hypothetical employer’s claim is that symmetrical treatment 
of men and women renders his actions nondiscriminatory.40
There are two weaknesses to the symmetry defense. First is that discrimina-
tion that is formally symmetrical is still problematic from a normative per-
spective because it still reflects and reinforces gender stereotypes that sex 
36   For background on “evolutionary versus fixed meaning” approaches to statutory inter-
pretation and “originalist” versus “living” approaches to constitutional interpretation, 
see Kent Greenawalt, “Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation,” in Oxford Handbook 
of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma, & 
Scott J. Shapiro eds.) (Oxford University Press 2004).
37   Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
38   See Zarda, supra note 25; Hively, supra note 25.
39   For this volume’s discussion about how sexual orientation discrimination relates to sex 
stereotyping, see Part Ii.A. For the discussion about how gender identity discrimination 
relates to sex stereotypes, see Part Ii.B.
40   For an example of a case embracing this objection, see Grant, supra note 25. For criticism 
of this argument, see, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, “The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights 
Cases,” 9 Journal of Law & Policy 397, 401–403 (2001); Robert Wintemute, “Recognising 
New Kinds of Direct Sex Discrimination: Transsexualism, Sexual Orientation and Dress 
Codes,” 60 Modern Law Review 334, 339–341 (1997).
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discrimination law seeks to dismantle.41 An employer who tells men that they 
must be stereotypically masculine by marrying a woman, and vice versa, en-
trenches gender stereotypes regardless of whether his heterosexual marriage 
requirement is symmetrically applied to both men and women. Second, his 
heterosexual marriage requirement may be formally symmetrical, but it is not 
symmetrical in its effects. Of course, the requirement has adverse effects on 
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. In many cultural traditions, the reinforcement of 
sex stereotypes also has an adverse effect on women. As commentators such 
as Andrew Koppelmen, Sylvia Law, and Robert Wintemute among others have 
long acknowledged, the perpetuation of sex stereotypes reinforces patriarchal 
gender roles for men and women.42
A third objection to treating SOGI discrimination as sex discrimination is 
that it is morally insufficient. This framing reduces anti-LGBT bias to an issue 
of sexism and sexism alone, whereas a stronger moral message against anti-
LGBT bias would be made if the government were to put SOGI front and center 
by declaring SOGI to be protected categories of their own. As Edward Stein 
put it, “when a law that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation is 
overturned in the face of the sex discrimination argument, the central moral 
debates about homosexuality are bracketed.”43 Stein’s observation could be ex-
panded to critique the framing of gender identity claims as sex discrimination 
claims.
Note that this critique about moral insufficiency does not suggest that it is 
legally or logically incorrect to treat SOGI discrimination as sex discrimina-
tion. Rather, the critique suggests that winning cases against SOGI discrimina-
tion by relying on sex discrimination arguments fails to completely address 
41   The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) calls 
for the elimination of “stereotyped roles for men and women.” Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (1980), Art. 5. For a discussion 
on grounding LGBTI rights in CEDAW’s anti-stereotyping principle, see Rikki Holtmaat 
& Paul Post, “Enhancing LGBTI Rights by Changing the Interpretation of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women?,” 33 Nordic Journal of 
Human Rights 319 (2005).
42   See Andrew Koppelman, “Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination,” 69 NYU Law Review 197 (1994); Law Sylvia A. Law, “Homosexuality and 
the Social Meaning of Gender,” 1988 Wisconsin Law Review 187 (1988); Wintemute, supra 
note 40.
43   Edward Stein, “Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Gay and Lesbian 
Rights,” 49 UCLA Law Review 471, 515 (2001). For variations on this argument, see 
Martha C. Nussbaum, From Disgust to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional 
Law, at 115 (Oxford University Press 2010); John Gardner, “On the Ground of Her 
Sex(uality),” 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 167, 182–183 (1998).
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underlying evils. To address this insufficiency, it would be ideal for courts to 
recognize SOGI as protected categories of their own, while recognizing that 
sexual orientation discrimination and gender identity discrimination are also 
forms of sex discrimination. This was the approach taken by the district court 
in the much-publicized legal challenge against California’s former ban on 
same-sex marriage.44 Although the court did not address gender identity, the 
court did recognize that banning same-sex marriage amounted to both im-
permissible sexual orientation discrimination and impermissible sex discrimi-
nation. This approach expresses a strong moral message against heterosexism 
while also illuminating the overlap between heterosexism and sexism. In some 
contexts, however, courts may not have the legal authority to recognize sexual 
orientation and gender identity as protected categories of their own.45 Thus, 
from a pragmatic perspective, it is sometimes necessary for advocates to rely 
solely on sex discrimination claims.46
III SOGI as Protected Categories of Their Own
Separate from the question of whether SOGI discrimination is a form of pro-
hibited sex discrimination is the question of whether sexual orientation and 
gender identity are protected categories in and of themselves. Many juris-
dictions around the world have answered this question in the affirmative.47 
Indeed, many more jurisdictions have chosen to recognize sexual orientation 
and gender identity as protected categories themselves, as opposed to protect-
ing against SOGI discrimination through sex discrimination laws.
Jurisdictions have taken divergent paths to recognizing sexual orientation 
and gender identity as protected categories. Part Iii.A discusses the most 
straightforward path, which is to explicitly list sexual orientation and gender 
identity as protected categories in discrimination laws. Parts Iii.B and Iii.C 
examine an alternative path, whereby courts deem sexual orientation and gen-
der identity to be protected categories through the exercise of judicial power. 
44   Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
45   In the California case discussed above, the court was interpreting the US Constitution’s 
open-ended Equal Protection Clause. This constitutional provision does not enumerate 
any protected categories. Thus, courts have needed to define constitutionally protected 
categories through case law. In the United States, the conventional wisdom is that courts 
do not have similar authority to add new protected categories to antidiscrimination stat-
utes that already include an exhaustive list of protected categories.
46   See Zarda, supra note 25; Hively, supra note 25.
47   Illustrative examples will be discussed in Part III.A–B.
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This usually happens in the context of constitutional adjudication and in the 
adjudication of international human rights. Part III.B sketches a picture of 
the legal landscape, showing that jurisdictions at various levels—international, 
regional, national, and subnational—have taken this judicial approach. Part 
III.C then illustrates the range of reasons that jurisdictions have offered for 
recognizing sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories 
through judicial power.
Before embarking on this Part’s analysis, a clarification is in order: for econ-
omy of language, this Part will often speak about jurisdictions collectively, 
referring to jurisdictions that, as a group, recognize sexual orientation and 
gender identity as protected categories. This does not mean that all of the indi-
vidual jurisdictions within this aggregation recognize both sexual orientation 
and gender identity as protected categories. Some jurisdictions recognize only 
sexual orientation as a protected category.48 Although it happens much more 
rarely, a jurisdiction may also recognize only gender identity but not sexual 
orientation.49
III.A Explicit Protections
Numerous jurisdictions around the world now have laws that explicitly recog-
nize sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories. The first 
area of relevant law is constitutional provisions concerning equality and dis-
crimination. Note that the right to nondiscrimination may be framed as a right 
to equality. As Mpoki Mwakagali has explained, equality and nondiscrimina-
tion are two sides of the same coin.50 According to a legal survey conducted 
by Raub et al. in 2014, ten national constitutions contained a right to equality 
based on sexual orientation,51 and among those constitutions, five contained 
language specifically protecting the right to sexual orientation equality in the 
48   For example, as discussed in Part III.A, ten countries have constitutions that explicitly 
ban sexual orientation discrimination, but only five of those ten also ban gender identity 
discrimination.
49   For example, India’s Supreme Court has stated that gender identity is a protected category 
under constitutional law, but it has not declared that sexual orientation is a protected 
category as well. See NALSA, supra note 29.
50   Mwakagali, supra note 13, at 2.
51   The ten countries were Bolivia, Ecuador, Fiji, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, 
South Africa, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Amy Raub et al., “Protections of Equal 
Rights across Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: An Analysis of 193 National 
Constitutions,” 28 Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 149, 157 (2016). Raub et. al did not in-
clude Kosovo, perhaps because of its disputed statehood. It is worth noting that the 2008 
Constitution of Kosovo, Art. 24(2), also lists sexual orientation as a protected category.
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context of employment.52 Five national constitutions contained a general 
right to equality based on gender identity,53 and three protected the right to 
gender identity equality specifically with respect to employment.54 After Raub 
et al. published their survey, one other country, Nepal, adopted a new constitu-
tion that protects “sexual minorities” against discrimination.55
Looking at their data in relative terms, Raub et al. found that only five per-
cent of national constitutions explicitly protected a right to equality based on 
sexual orientation.56 Further, only three percent explicitly protected a right to 
equality based on gender identity.57 In contrast, 84 percent of national con-
stitutions contained a provision that explicitly protected the right to equality 
based on sex.58 This disparity underscores the practical relevance of the ques-
tion examined in the previous Part of this volume: does SOGI discrimination 
constitute a form of sex discrimination? Because so many constitutions explic-
itly ban sex discrimination but not SOGI discrimination, human rights defend-
ers may find it useful to argue that SOGI discrimination is already banned by 
these constitutions’ sex discrimination provisions.
Beyond constitutional law, a growing number of jurisdictions are also pass-
ing legislative protections that explicitly recognize sexual orientation and gen-
der identity as protected grounds.59 One survey of laws published in 2017 found 
that 72 countries have statewide employment discrimination legislation recog-
nizing sexual orientation as a protected category.60 Many jurisdictions have 
also undertaken legislative reforms to prohibit sexual orientation discrimina-
tion in additional contexts, such as education, housing, and the provision of 
52   The five countries were Bolivia, Ecuador, New Zealand, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. 
Id. at 158.
53   The five countries were Bolivia, Ecuador, Fiji, Malta, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 157.
54   The three countries were Bolivia, Ecuador, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 157–58.
55   Nepal Constitution of 2015, Sec. 18(3).
56   Id. at 157.
57   Id.
58   Id.
59   This volume draws a distinction between constitutions, which are typically entrenched, 
versus ordinary legislation, which typically is not entrenched. The volume draws this 
analytical distinction because it is so widely adopted in legal systems around the world. 
However, some jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom do not maintain this strict dis-
tinction. For background reading on the United Kingdom’s uncodified and unentrenched 
constitution, see Eric Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law, at 26–34 (Oxford 
University Press 1998).
60   Aengus Carroll & Lucas Ramón Mendos, ILGA, State-Sponsored Homophobia: A World 
Survey of Sexual Orientation Laws: Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition, at 8 (12th 
ed. 2017).
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goods and services.61 A variety of jurisdictions have also enacted legislation 
that explicitly bans discrimination based on gender identity.62 Legislative re-
forms that make sexual orientation and gender identity protected categories 
have been undertaken not only by national governments, but also by subna-
tional governments ranging from states and cities within the United States to 
provinces and municipalities in the Philippines.63
III.B Protection by Analogy: The Landscape
When codified law does not explicitly list sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity as protected categories, courts and quasi-judicial bodies might interpret 
open-ended equality protections to prohibit SOGI discrimination nonethe-
less. In other words, courts interpret these protections to create a presumption 
against SOGI discrimination, similar to how the law presumes that discrimi-
nation based on other protected categories is unlawful.64 To the best of my 
knowledge, there have been no published reports that survey all the jurisdic-
tions where tribunals have concluded that sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity discrimination are protected categories even though codified law does 
not expressly state so. Based on a cursory scan of jurisdictions, however, one 
sees that this approach has been adopted by a diverse range of jurisdictions at 
multiple levels: international, regional, national, and subnational.
At the international level, for example, the United Nations Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has explained in a General 
Comment that the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity.65 The ICESCR guarantees that the rights in the treaty shall 
“be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, 
61   Id. at 54–60.
62   See Muntarbhorn, supra note 6 (noting Australia, Germany, Sweden, and Quezon City in 
the Philippines as examples of jurisdictions that have legislation banning discrimination 
based on gender identity). To the best of my knowledge, there has not been any published 
research that comprehensively surveys laws around the world that make gender identity 
a protected category.
63   See Movement Advancement Project, supra note 14 (illustrating that 22 states within the 
United States include sexual orientation, and sometimes gender identity, as legislatively 
protected categories); Eric Julian Manalastas, Anti-Discrimination Ordinances, pages.upd 
.edu.ph/ejmanalastas/policies-ordinances (last visited 4 April 2018) (listing 2 provinces 
and 11 municipalities in the Philippines that include sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity as protected categories).
64   Cf. Mwakagali, supra note 13, at 2.
65   Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 20, 
UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/20, 2 July 2009, para. 32.
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language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status.”66 Neither sexual orientation nor gender identity 
is expressly mentioned in this list of protected categories, but the CESCR has 
concluded that both sexual orientation and gender identity are protected as 
“other status[es]” that fall within the treaty’s purview.67
Similarly, at the regional level, the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have both held that sexual orientation 
is a protected category under their respective treaties, even though it is not 
specifically enumerated as such.68 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has stated that gender identity is a protected category as well.69 Meanwhile, 
apex domestic courts in places ranging from Canada70 to Hong Kong71 and 
Taiwan72 have held that sexual orientation is a protected category under con-
stitutional law, even though it is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution. 
Subnational tribunals have also reached this conclusion.73
Most of the examples to be discussed in this section concern sexual orienta-
tion because there are very few judicial opinions on whether gender identity is 
a protected category unto itself.74 Not all courts that have been presented with 
the opportunity to recognize sexual orientation as a protected category have 
chosen to do so. For example, in 2013, the Singapore Supreme Court’s Court 
of Appeal distinguished sexual orientation from other grounds of discrimina-
tion that are explicitly protected in Singapore’s constitution.75 The court did 
not treat sexual orientation as a protected category and, therefore, subjected 
Singapore’s discriminatory sodomy law to a highly deferential form of judicial 
review. Likewise, in upholding the criminalization of same-sex sodomy, the 
apex courts in Botswana and Zimbabwe could have declared sexual orientation 
66   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Art. 2, para. 2.
67   CESCR, supra note 65, para. 32.
68   See, e.g., Karner v. Austria ECtHR, No. 40016/98, 24 July 2003; Atala-Riffo & Daughters 
v. Chile, IACtHR (Judgment) 24 February 2012, para. 91; Aaron Baker, “Proportional, Not 
Strict, Scrutiny: Against a U.S. ‘Suspect Classifications’ Model Under Article 14 ECHR in 
the U.K.,” 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 847, 888–889 (2008).
69   Atala-Riffo & Daughters, supra note 68, para. 91.
70   Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, 495.
71   Secretary for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung Zigo, [2007] 10 HKCFAR 335.
72   Judicial Yuan (JY) Interpretation No. 748 (2017).
73   E.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public 
Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Connecticut 2008); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (California 
2008).
74   For an exceptional example where gender identity is recognized as a protected catego-
ry, see Atala-Riffo & Daughters, supra note 68, para. 91. See also CESCR, supra note 65, 
para. 32.
75   Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26 (CA 2014).
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to be a protected category, but they chose not to.76 In the United States, some 
states’ apex courts have also rejected the idea that sexual orientation is a pro-
tected category.77
It is worth noting that the United States is exceptional in its treatment of 
protected categories under constitutional law. The US Constitution does not 
explicitly list any protected categories,78 but the US Supreme Court has held 
that certain types of discrimination warrant more rigorous judicial review 
than others.79 Most jurisdictions subject discrimination based on any protect-
ed category to the same rigorous proportionality analysis, while discrimination 
based on unprotected categories are either reviewed under highly deferential 
standards or categorically rejected. In contrast, the United States has created 
multiple tiers of judicial review for equal protection cases.80 For example, race 
discrimination is subject to “strict scrutiny,” sex discrimination is subject to 
“intermediate scrutiny,” and most other forms of discrimination are subject 
to deferential “rational basis review.”81
The US Supreme Court has been opaque about what level of review should 
be applied to sexual orientation discrimination.82 Many commentators have 
suggested that the Supreme Court has subjected sexual orientation discrimi-
nation to a de facto tier of review that commentators call “rational basis review 
with bite,” which is not as rigorous as that which the Court applies to race or 
sex discrimination, but is also not as deferential as traditional rational basis re-
view. The Court itself has not used the phrase “rational basis review with bite.”83 
Indeed, it has been unclear about whether, or to what extent, sexual orienta-
tion is a protected category, thus prompting criticism from commentators who 
have chided the Court for its opacity.84 Meanwhile, the Court has yet to hear a 
constitutional case concerning gender identity discrimination.
76   EK Quansah makes this point in “Same-sex Relationships in Botswana: Current 
Perspectives and Future Prospects,” 4 African Human Rights Law Journal 201 (2004).
77   E.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 974–975 (Washington 2006); Conaway v. Deane, 
932 A.2d 571, 607–608 (Maryland 2007).
78   The US Constitution protects people’s rights to “the equal protection of the laws,” but 
it does not enumerate any specific protected categories. United States Constitution, 
Amendment XIV, Sec. 1.
79   See Holning Lau & Hillary Li, “American Equal Protection and Global Convergence,” 86 
Fordham Law Review 1251, 1266–1267 (2017).
80   See id.
81   See id.
82   See Hunter, supra note 14.
83   See Lau & Li, supra note 79, at 1269.
84   See id.; Peter Nicolas, “Obergefell’s Squandered Potential,” 6 California Law Review Circuit 
137, 137–144 (2015).
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III.C Protection by Analogy: Underlying Reasoning
SOGI discrimination has presented courts with a vexing question: if the consti-
tution’s equality clause does not explicitly say that a particular characteristic is 
protected, what should be the criteria for determining whether the character-
istic qualifies as a prohibited ground of discrimination? In some jurisdictions, 
courts may face this question for the first time when reviewing cases concern-
ing sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination. To answer whether 
these characteristics are protected categories, even though the constitution 
does not enumerate them as such, courts have generally reasoned by analogy.85
One approach to this analogical inquiry would be to say that SOGI discrimi-
nation is so similar to sex discrimination that sexual orientation and gender 
identity should themselves be protected statuses just like sex. The Delhi High 
Court in India adopted this reasoning to conclude that sexual orientation is a 
protected category.86 The Court did not say that sexual orientation discrimi-
nation is a form of sex discrimination, as some other courts have;87 it stated 
instead that “sexual orientation is a ground analogous to sex and that discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation is not permitted …”88
Most courts, however, have not relied on reasoning that analogizes SOGI to 
sex. Instead of analogizing only to sex, courts have sought to identify a set of 
factors for determining whether characteristics qualify as prohibited grounds 
of discrimination. The factors for protection have varied from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction. Even within a single jurisdiction, the factors have sometimes 
evolved. Indeed, there is no consensus among courts and commentators on 
a test for determining whether a characteristic is protected. It is beyond the 
scope of this volume to propose any sort of model test. Instead, the remainder 
of this section provides background on some of the factors that have emerged, 
and been debated, in the jurisprudence. These factors include (1) whether 
there has been a history or frequentness of irrational discrimination based on 
the characteristic, (2) whether groups defined by the characteristic are politi-
cally powerless, and (3) whether the characteristic is immutable.
The first factor is a history or frequentness of unreasonable discrimina-
tion based on the particular characteristic. For example, the Supreme Court 
of Canada has said that analogous grounds of discrimination—i.e., grounds 
85   Susanne Baer, “Equality,” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, at 996–
997 (András Sajó & Michel Rosenfeld eds.) (Oxford University Press 2012).
86   Pritam Baruah, “Logic and Coherence in Naz Foundation: The Arguments of 
Nondiscrimination, Privacy, and Dignity,” 2 NUJS Law Review 515 (2009).
87   For examples of this this reasoning, see Part II.A.
88   Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, W.P. (C) No. 7455/2001, 160 (2009) DLT 
277, para. 104.
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that are not enumerated in the constitution but are sufficiently analogous—
“often serve as the basis for stereotypical decisions made not on the basis of 
merit …”89 This observation was a core component to the court’s conclusion 
that sexual orientation is a protected category even though the constitution 
does not explicitly say so.90 More recently, in its landmark same-sex marriage 
case, the Taiwan Constitutional Court concluded that sexual orientation is a 
protected category after it took note of historical discrimination against gays 
and lesbians based on stereotypes.91 Other jurisdictions have similarly looked 
to the history and frequentness of unreasonable discrimination as a factor for 
determining protected status.92
This rationale advances certain normative principles of equality law, such 
as anti-stereotyping and anti-subordination, both of which are connected to 
the protection of human dignity. If a characteristic has often been the basis 
for irrational discrimination—discrimination stemming from problematic 
stereotyping or subordination—courts have reason to double-check the po-
litical branches for recommitting these sins. Thus, the history or frequentness 
rationale justifies a presumption against such discrimination. Note, however, 
that determining protected categories based on the history or frequentness of 
discrimination may result in under-inclusiveness because new forms of irratio-
nal discrimination may arise. In such situations, courts should be empowered 
to scrutinize the discrimination if their aim is to combat irrational stereotyp-
ing and subordination.93
Political power is another factor that various courts around the world have 
invoked. This factor is often traced back to the US Supreme Court opinion 
in United States v. Carolene Products Company.94 The Court suggested that, 
89   Corbière v. Canada, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203. In Corbière, the Supreme Court of Canada also 
noted that analogous grounds of discrimination are based on “a personal characteristic 
that is immutable or changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity.” Id. at 206. 
This immutability requirement is discussed below in notes 103–110 and accompanying 
text.
90   Vriend, supra note 70.
91   JY Interpretation 748, supra note 72.
92   At the international level, consider the CESCR. It has stated that analogous grounds of dis-
crimination “are commonly recognized when they reflect the experience of social groups 
that are vulnerable and have suffered and continue to suffer marginalization.” CESCR, 
supra note 65, para. 27.
93   For example, imagine a hypothetical society that had not experienced racial discrimina-
tion until very recently because the society had been racially homogenous until the recent 
arrival of immigrants from a different racial background. One may argue that race should 
still be a protected category in this country despite its lack of prior race discrimination.
94   304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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if a group of people defined by a particular characteristic has lacked politi-
cal power, such political powerlessness supports making that group status a 
protected category. Specifically, the case referenced social groups that lack po-
litical power due to being “discrete and insular minorities” such as racial and 
religious minorities.95 Commentators have explained protecting such disem-
powered groups in terms of democratic theory: because certain social groups 
are unable to advance their interests through democratic processes (e.g., due 
to the group’s small size), courts have good reason to play a particularly large 
role in protecting such groups against prejudices held by the democratic 
majority.96 In these cases, judicial review of discriminatory actions corrects for 
inadequacies in democratic governance. As the US Supreme Court explained, 
the political powerlessness rationale protects groups “in need of extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.”97
The political powerlessness factor can work in conjunction with the history 
or frequentness factor. A social group may lack political power due to a history 
of stereotyping and subordination. For example, although women are not a 
numerical minority in most societies, they may be politically disadvantaged 
because of societal structures shaped by a history of sexist stereotypes and 
subordination. In this situation, granting women protected status addresses 
not only democratic failures, but also the history of sex-based stereotyping and 
subordination.
A variety of courts—ranging from courts in the United States to the Taiwan 
Constitutional Court—have pointed to the comparative political disadvantage 
of gays and lesbians as a factor that supports treating sexual orientation as a 
protected category.98 Yet, the political powerlessness factor has its shortcom-
ings. One line of criticism centers on the difficulty in operationalizing the 
factor. How exactly is political power to be determined?99 If women and/or 
members of racial minority groups are elected to some of the country’s highest 
political offices, does that fact suggest that their respective social groups are 
now politically powerful? Would it necessarily follow that those social groups 
95   Id. at 152–153 n. 4.
96   See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, at 143 (Harvard University Press 1993); 
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, at 153–170 (Harvard University Press 1980).
97   San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
98   E.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 182–185 (2nd Cir. 2012); JY Interpretation 748, 
supra note 72; Varnum, supra note 73, at 894–895.
99   For scholarship that grapples with the question of how to determine political power, see, 
e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, “Political Powerlessness,” 90 NYU Law Review 1527 (2015); 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “‘Not Without Political Power’: Gays and Lesbians, Equal 
Protection, and the Suspect Class Doctrine,” 65 Alabama Law Review 975 (2013–2014).
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are no longer protected categories? These are questions that have vexed com-
mentators. In some jurisdictions, courts have refused to recognize sexual ori-
entation as a protected category in part because they found gays and lesbians 
to have political power.100 However, there is a normative critique that, even if 
it is abundantly clear that previously subordinated social groups now have po-
litical power (e.g., blacks in South Africa), the characteristics that define those 
social groups (e.g., race) should still be a protected category because discrimi-
nation based on that category is rarely rational. In this sense, making political 
powerlessness a requirement for protected categories creates an underinclu-
sive list of protected categories.
Indeed, in some jurisdictions, the relevance of political powerlessness to 
judicial reasoning seems to be in decline although court opinions have not 
made clear why that is so. For example, in the United States, despite Carolene 
Products having inspired theories about political powerlessness, the Supreme 
Court has gone on to treat race and sex as protected (i.e., “suspect” and “quasi-
suspect”) categories even when it was whites or men—politically powerful 
groups—who complained of discrimination.101 In Canada, the Supreme Court 
had mentioned political power as a factor in identifying analogous grounds of 
constitutional protection in the past, but more recent articulations of the crite-
ria for protected status have omitted any reference to political power.102
Immutability is another factor that is sometimes considered by courts when 
determining whether a category is protected. Courts initially defined immu-
tability narrowly as biological characteristics that cannot be changed. For ex-
ample, the US Supreme Court referred to race and sex as “immutable” because, 
according to the Court, these biological traits are “accidents of birth” that can-
not be changed.103 This conceptualization of immutability is tied to the no-
tion that people should not be discriminated against based on traits that they 
cannot control.104 However, if a trait can be modified, individuals bear more 
responsibility for protecting themselves by conforming to the government’s 
100   See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 77; Conaway, supra note 77.
101   See Julie A. Nice, “Equal Protection’s Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive 
Approach,” 85 Cornell Law Review 1392, 1400–1402 (2000).
102   For a discussion on the evolution of relevant cases in Canada, see Rosalind Dixon, “The 
Supreme Court of Canada and Constitutional (Equality) Baselines,” 50 Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal 637 (2003).
103   Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678–679 (1973) (plurality opinion). Notwithstanding 
the US Supreme Court’s understanding of race and sex being immutable, whether one’s 
race and sex can be changed remains contested. Note, for example, that a growing num-
ber of jurisdictions allow transgender individuals to change their sex on government 
identification documents.
104   Id. at 678–679.
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demands. Thus, laws that discriminate based on immutable characteristics 
ought to be subject to strong judicial review.
This traditional conceptualization of immutability has been criticized for 
being too narrow,105 and courts have begun to take a more expansive view. 
The traditional immutability requirement could not explain, for example, why 
non-biological traits such as religion are so commonly considered protected 
categories. Courts have now broadened the definition of immutability to in-
clude traits that can only be changed with great difficulty or at great cost to 
an individual’s sense of self.106 Some commentators have referred to this as 
“soft”107 or “constructive”108 immutability. Certain jurisdictions no longer even 
use the word “immutability” to describe soft immutability, but they arrive at the 
same outcome through different language. For example, the Supreme Court of 
Canada has said that protected analogous categories are usually “immutable or 
changeable only at unacceptable cost to personal identity.”109 Relatedly, in Hong 
Kong, the Court of Final Appeal has stated that protected categories implicate 
“core-values relating to personal or human characteristics” including sexual 
orientation.110 Although the court did not use the term “immutability,” its ref-
erence to “personal or human characteristics” comports with the notion of soft 
immutability encompassing traits that can only be changed at great cost to 
personal identity.
This move from traditional immutability to soft immutability has made 
it more likely that courts will treat sexual orientation and gender identity as 
protected categories. Although the biological basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity are contested, it seems less controversial to say that these are 
deeply personal characteristics—ones that can only be changed at great cost 
to the individual.111
105   For a discussion of such criticisms, see Jessica A. Clarke, “Against Immutability,” 125 Yale 
Law Journal 2, 18–23 (2015).
106   For a discussion of this broadened conception of immutability in Canada, see Dixon, 
supra note 102, at 648–652. For a discussion of cases from the United States, see Clarke, 
supra note 105, at 21–27.
107   E.g. Edward Stein, “Immutability and Innateness Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, 
and Bisexual Rights,” 89 Chicago-Kent Law Review 597 (2014); Joseph Landau, “ ‘Soft 
Immutability’ and ‘Imputed Gay Identity’: Recent Developments in Transgender and 
Sexual-Orientation-Based Asylum Law,” 32 Fordham Urban Law Journal 237 (2005).
108   E.g., Dixon, supra note 102.
109   Corbière, supra note 89, at 206 (emphasis added).
110   Fok Chun Wa v. Hospital Authority, [2012] 15 H.K.C.F.A.R. 409 para. 5 (C.F.A.).
111   See Stein, supra note 107, at 634.
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IV Sequential Development of sogi Discrimination Protections
As SOGI discrimination protections have developed around the world, so have 
narratives about the trajectories for incrementally developing these protec-
tions. This Part describes and interrogates two primary narratives. The first 
narrative states that rights protections proceed in a particular order based on 
the type of protection. It claims that sexual orientation nondiscrimination is 
first protected with respect to the regulation of sexual activity, then employ-
ment, then same-sex partnership recognition through alternatives to marriage, 
then equal marriage rights, then parenting rights. The narrative also suggests 
that rights to gender identity nondiscrimination typically lags behind sexual 
orientation nondiscrimination. A second narrative concerns cultural groups. 
This narrative suggests that Western states lead in the development of SOGI 
nondiscrimination protections and then the rest of the world follows. This part 
of the volume interrogates these conventional narratives about trajectories of 
change and reveals their flaws. It will also consider the potential harms of per-
petuating these flawed narratives.
IV.A Rethinking Sequential Rights
Commentators have observed that the development of LGBT rights often 
follows familiar sequences, especially with respect to discrimination based 
on sexual orientation. Kees Waaldijk, for example, observed that European 
countries tended to follow a similar path: first a country would decriminal-
ize sodomy, then equalize age-of-consent laws for same-sex and different-sex 
sexual activity, then pass national antidiscrimination legislation pertaining to 
sexual orientation, then offer same-sex couples some form of legal recogni-
tion short of marriage, followed by full marriage equality.112 Drawing on the 
research of Waaldijk, scholars such as William Eskridge and Yuval Merin wrote 
that a similar pattern might be expected in the United States.113 In my own con-
versations in various parts of the world, I have heard some advocates adhere to 
112   Kees Waaldijk, “Civil Developments: Patterns of Reform in the Legal Position of Same-Sex 
Partners in Europe,” 17 Canadian Journal of Family Law 62 (2000); Kees Waaldijk, “Others 
May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage Quasi-Marriage, and Semi-Marriage for Same-
Sex Couples in European Countries,” 38 New England Law Review 569 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter “Others May Follow”]; Kees Waaldijk, “Standard Sequences in the Legal Recognition 
of Homosexuality—Europe’s Past, Present, and Future,” 4 Australian Gay & Lesbian Law 
Journal 50 (1994) [hereinafter “Standard Sequences”].
113   William N. Eskridge Jr., “Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-
by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition,” 31 McGeorge Law Review 641, 647–648 
(1999–2000); Yuval Merin, Equality for Same-Sex Couples: The Legal Recognition of Gay 
Partnerships in Europe and the United States, at 326 (University of Chicago Press 2012).
26 Lau
the received wisdom that law reform must follow in a particular sequence of 
steps that reflects the European experience.
In the time since Waaldijk’s research, however, non-European jurisdic-
tions have deviated from this sequence of rights development. Consider, for 
example, the United States. The United States has differed from Europe in sev-
eral ways. In contrast to the European experience, the United States extended 
nationwide marriage rights to same-sex couples before protecting LGB per-
sons from discrimination in contexts such as private employment, housing, 
and public accommodations. One explanation for this is the relatively strong 
role played by courts in the United States. When Waaldijk studied Europe, the 
countries that had legalized same-sex marriage had done so through legisla-
tive means.114 In the United States, however, courts have played a large role 
in the legalization of same-sex marriage. At the national level, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Obergefell v. United States that state bans on same-sex marriage 
are unconstitutional, which in effect brought same-sex marriage to the entire 
country.115 By the time the Supreme Court decided Obergefell, same-sex mar-
riage was already legal in thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia.116
Notably, when the US Supreme Court decided Obergefell in 2015, the United 
States lacked—and it still lacks—a federal law banning SOGI discrimination 
in areas such as private employment, housing, and public accommodations. 
Due to the doctrine of “state action,” US courts lack power to address discrimi-
nation in these contexts through constitutional law.117 Meanwhile, Congress 
has refused to pass legislation explicitly banning SOGI discrimination in the 
private sphere despite the efforts of civil rights advocates.118 At the time of this 
writing, nearly three years after Obergefell was decided, a majority of states 
within the United States still lack any state-level protections against discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation or gender identity in the context of private-
sector employment, housing, and public accommodation.119
As discussed above, some federal courts of appeal in the United States now 
interpret Title VII’s ban on sex-based employment discrimination to subsume 
114   E.g., Waaldijk, “Others May Follow,” supra note 112 (discussing legislative acts that legal-
ized same-sex marriage in the Netherlands and in Belgium).
115   See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
116   See Holning Lau, “Comparative Perspectives on Strategic Remedial Delays,” 91 Tulane Law 
Review 259, 270–271 (2016).
117   See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 
10–11 (1883). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies, at 
Sec. 6.4 (Wolters Kluwer, 5th ed. 2015).
118   See Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, “Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: The Next 
Gay Rights Battle,” 67 Florida Law Review 1099, 1144–1145 (2016).
119   See Movement Advancement Project, supra note 14.
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sexual orientation discrimination.120 Note, however, that these courts did not 
adopt this position until after Obergefell.121 In reaching their decisions, the fed-
eral appellate courts in the Second and Seventh Circuits both cited Obergefell; 
they noted how paradoxical it would be to protect an individual’s right to 
marry someone of the same sex but then fail to protect that individual against 
being fired from work for entering a same-sex marriage.122 Marriage equality 
in the United States thus contributed to the eventual development of employ-
ment discrimination rights via case law.
In this sense, the United States presents a very different narrative from that 
of Europe. In much of Europe, the prohibition of sexual orientation discrimi-
nation through legislation, including European Union law, influenced social 
norms in ways that facilitated the development of partnership recognition 
legislation and the eventual legalization of same-sex marriage.123 This pattern 
held true for some states in the United States, especially those that legalized 
same-sex marriage through legislation or referendum.124 However, in most 
parts of the United States, and at the federal level, legalization of same-sex 
marriage was achieved through litigation that predated development of other 
antidiscrimination protections.125
While I have been focusing on the United States as a contrasting case to 
Europe, the United States is not alone. On the other side of the world is the 
example of Hong Kong. Like in the United States, courts in Hong Kong have 
played a pivotal role in advancing LGBT rights through constitutional law.126 
Indeed, Hong Kong’s courts appear poised to extend legal recognition to 
same-sex couples under certain circumstances, even though Hong Kong’s 
Legislative Council has yet to pass any legislation to ban sexual orientation 
120   See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
121   See Zarda, supra note 25; Hively, supra note 25.
122   See Zarda, supra note 25, at 131 n.33; Hively, supra note 25, at 342, 349–350.
123   See Merin, supra note 113, at 314–318, 326–333.
124   These states include Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. The 
District of Columbia also followed this pattern.
125   See National Conference of State Legislatures, Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 26 June 2015, 
www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx (providing a histo-
ry of the development of same-sex marriage rights in the United States); Jerome Hunt, A 
State-by-State Examination of Nondiscrimination Laws and Policies (Center for American 
Progress 2012) (providing a history of state-level SOGI discrimination bans in the United 
States).
126   See Yau Yuk Lung Zigo, supra note 71; Leung T.C. William Roy v. Secretary for Justice, 
[2006] 4 HKLRD 211 (CA); W v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 16 HKCFAR 112 (CFA); QT v. 
Director of Immigration, [2017] HKEC 2051 (CA). But see Leung Chun Kwong v. Secretary 
for the Civil Service, [2018] HKCA 318 (CA).
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discrimination. In a case currently pending before Hong Kong’s Court of Final 
Appeal, the court below held that, for immigration purposes, Hong Kong must 
recognize the union of two women who entered a civil partnership abroad.127 
The court ruled that doing otherwise would violate nondiscrimination pro-
tections in Hong Kong’s Basic Law and Bill of Rights. There is also pending 
litigation concerning whether a same-sex couple that married overseas has a 
right to be recognized as married for civil servant spousal benefits and taxa-
tion purposes. Although the Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the same-
sex couple with respect to civil servant benefits,128 the Court of Appeal ruled 
against the couple.129 The case is now likely to go to Hong Kong’s Court of Final 
Appeal. While these cases are still pending, there is a good chance that Hong 
Kong’s judiciary will ultimately recognize legal rights of same-sex couples, at 
least for certain purposes, to maintain fidelity to its compelling case law on 
sexual orientation discrimination.130
Although Hong Kong’s courts have ruled that sexual orientation is a prohib-
ited ground of discrimination under constitutional law,131 those constitutional 
provisions do not regulate private contexts. Meanwhile, Hong Kong’s govern-
ment has declined to ban sexual orientation discrimination in private domains 
through legislation.132 Because Hong Kong’s law reform has been led by courts 
applying constitutional rights, Hong Kong seems poised to remedy discrimina-
tion with respect to the government’s recognition of same-sex couples before 
addressing discrimination in contexts such as private employment. This se-
quence stands in contrast to the sequence from Europe.
Thus far, we have been discussing divergence from the European sequence 
regarding marriage and antidiscrimination legislation. There are additional 
points of divergence related to family law. In the United States, same-sex par-
enting rights often pre-dated partnership recognition rights, while the oppo-
site was true for Europe.133 It is not immediately clear why the United States 
did not follow the European sequence. One can speculate that the deviation 
127   QT, supra note 126.
128   Leung Chun Kwong v. Secretary for the Civil Service, [2017] 2 HKLRD 1132 (CFI).
129   Leung Chun Kwong, supra note 126.
130   See supra note 126.
131   E.g., Yau Yuk Lung Zigo, supra note 71; Leung T.C. William Roy, supra note 126.
132   For a critique of the Legislative Council’s failure to act, see Carole J. Petersen, “Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity in Hong Kong: A Case for the Strategic Use of Human 
Rights Treaties and the International Reporting Process,” 14 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy 
Journal 28, 57–70 (2013).
133   See Merin, supra note 113, at 263; Nancy D. Polikoff, “Recognizing Partners but Not Parents/
Recognizing Parents but Not Partners: Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the 
United States,” 17 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 711 (2000).
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was linked, in part, to patterns of family law reform driven by different-sex 
couples. For example, Douglas NeJaime has written about how gay and lesbian 
parents in the United States leveraged changing conceptions of parenthood 
spurred by different-sex couples’ advocacy for rights related to assisted repro-
ductive technologies and stepparent adoptions.134 Europe did not experience a 
similar wave of law reform concerning different-sex couples’ parenting rights. 
Nancy Polikoff has pointed out that there has been a greater need for adoptive 
parents in the United States compared with Europe, especially with respect to 
the number of children in the foster care system.135 This backdrop is not 
specific to same-sex couples, but it helped same-sex couples when they vol-
unteered to adopt children who needed homes. Polikoff also pointed to the 
larger role played by US courts in developing parenting rights.136 These various 
factors may explain why same-sex couples in the United States were able to 
secure parenting rights before gaining legal recognition of their partnerships.
Another difference between Europe and the United States is the fact that 
European governments have typically extended non-marital forms of legal 
recognition to same-sex couples—such as rights to registered partnerships 
or recognition through de facto cohabitation—prior to extending full mar-
riage rights to same-sex couples.137 These “marriage light” alternatives to 
marriage were viewed by scholars as important stepping stones toward the 
legalization of same-sex marriage.138 Most states in the United States, how-
ever, bypassed these stepping stones in legalizing same-sex marriage.139 Many 
European jurisdictions first extended marriage alternatives to different-sex 
partnerships, for example through recognition of unregistered cohabitants.140 
Thus, there was already a precedent on which same-sex couples could rely 
to argue for similar partnership recognition.141 In the United States, however, 
different-sex couples’ options for legal recognition have tended to be limited to 
marriage and, where alternatives for different-sex couples do exist, they were 
134   Douglas NeJaime, “Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood,” 129 Harvard Law Review 
1185, 1208–1212 (2016).
135   Polikoff, supra note 133, at 714.
136   Id.
137   See Waaldijk, “Others May Follow,” supra note 112, at 589.
138   E.g., id.; Merin, supra note 113, at 314–318, 326–333.
139   For a discussion of civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other alternatives to mar-
riage in the United States, see National Center for Lesbian Rights, Marriage, Domestic 
Partnerships, and Civil Unions: Same-Sex Couples Within the United States (2017).
140   See Waaldijk, “Standard Sequences,” supra note 112, at 66.
141   Cf. Polikoff, supra note 133, at 714 (discussing European jurisdictions’ interest in develop-
ing partnership recognition rights because of their social welfare systems).
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usually created at the same time that marriage alternatives were created for 
same-sex couples.142
Yet another divergence worth noting relates to transgender rights. In the 
United States, the conventional narrative is that mainstream LGBT rights or-
ganizations focused, for a long time, on advancing sexual orientation rights, 
leaving gender identity issues on the back burner.143 As a result, law reform 
regarding sexual orientation discrimination advanced more quickly. This is 
evident, for example, in the fact that the US Supreme Court has yet to hear a 
case about transgender discrimination. However, it has decided numerous sex-
ual orientation rights cases, including cases in which gay and lesbian plaintiffs 
won landmark victories. The disparity of protection is also evident in the fact 
that most states with state-level SOGI antidiscrimination legislation first ad-
dressed sexual orientation before extending protections to gender identity.144 
At the time of this writing, two states—Wisconsin and New Hampshire—
still only bar sexual orientation discrimination, but not gender identity 
discrimination.145
This narrative that places progress on sexual orientation rights before gen-
der identity rights is not universal. There are jurisdictions outside the West 
that formalized protection of gender identity rights before protecting sexual 
orientation rights. For example, India and Pakistan have taken steps to address 
gender identity discrimination, yet these countries still criminalize same-sex 
sexual intimacy.146 In fact, in 2014 the Supreme Court of India rejected a con-
stitutional challenge to India’s criminalization of homosexual sexual activity;147 
that same year, the Court handed down a sweeping ruling that the Indian con-
stitution prohibits discrimination based on gender identity, and that individu-
als have a constitutional right to determine for themselves whether to identify 
as male, female, or a third gender.148 In 2017, the Indian Supreme Court cast 
doubt on its earlier decision that upheld India’s ban on same-sex intimacy, 
142   See Erez Aloni, “Registering Relationships,” 87 Tulane Law Review 573, 586–594 (2013).
143   See Minter, supra note 10.
144   See Hunt, supra note 125, at 3.
145   Movement Advancement Project, supra note 14.
146   See NaLSA, supra note 29; Asad Hashim, “Pakistan passes landmark transgender rights 
law,” Al Jazeera, 9 May 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/pakistan-passes-landmark-
transgender-rights-law-180509095207950.html. But see Dhrubo Jyoti, “Cut the Red Tape: 
Why the New Transgender Rights Bill Might Harm the Community,” Hindustan Times, 26 
July 2017 (highlighting delays in implementation of India’s landmark NaLSA decision).
147   Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, SCC 1 (2014).
148   NaLSA, supra note 29.
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and it appears positioned to officially overrule that decision in the near fu-
ture.149 Still, my point here is that the Court’s protection against gender iden-
tity discrimination preceded any future decriminalization of same-sex sexual 
intimacy. One potential reason for this is local culture, which has a long history 
of conceptualizing gender beyond two rigid categories. As the Indian Supreme 
Court noted: “Historical background of Transgenders in India … [is such] that 
they were once treated with great respect, at least in the past, though not in 
the present.”150
In sum, we should be cautious about viewing any specific sequencing of 
rights developments to be universal and natural. Developments in many parts 
of the world have not conformed to scholars’ earlier observations about se-
quential ordering of rights developments in Europe. While further research is 
needed to determine more firmly the range of factors that contribute to the 
sequencing of rights development, this volume has illuminated three potential 
factors: the role of judicial review in the particular jurisdiction, the backdrop of 
law reform concerning issues not specific to SOGI (e.g., debates about artificial 
reproductive assistance), and local cultural history.
IV.B Rethinking Westernization Narratives
Another familiar narrative suggests that protections against SOGI discrimi-
nation originate in the West, and then the rest of the world imports these 
legal constructs belatedly. Indeed, writers sometimes describe the devel-
opment of SOGI discrimination protections outside the West as a form of 
“westernization.”151 Such westernization narratives, however, are problematic 
for a few reasons that this section will explore.
First, westernization narratives are only accurate if one evaluates SOGI 
rights through a very particular lens. To be sure, by some important mea-
sures, the so-called West152 does lead in developing protections against SOGI 
149   In the landmark privacy case of Justice Puttaswamy (Ret’d) & Anr. v. Union of India and 
Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 (2017), the lead judgment and Justice Kaul’s con-
curring judgment repudiated the Koushal case concerning same-sex sodomy, but they 
stopped short of officially overruling Koushal because a pending case is directly reevalu-
ating Koushal. See also Menaka Guruswamy, “Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Ret’d) and Anr v. 
Union of India and Ors,” 111 American Journal of International Law 994 (2017).
150   NaLSA, supra note 29, at para. 44.
151   I have previously critiqued this practice in Holning Lau, “The Language of Westernization 
in Legal Commentary,” 61 American Journal of Comparative Law 507, 519–522 (2013).
152   The boundaries of “the West” are contested and some commentators have criticized the 
use of the term. See, e.g., Hugh Gusterson, “The Seven Deadly Sins of Samuel Huntington,” 
in Why America’s Top Pundits Are Wrong, at 28–29 (Catherine Besteman & Hugh Gusterson 
eds.) (University of California Press 2005).
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discrimination. For example, most countries that have extended marriage 
rights to same-sex couples are part of the Western world. Painting with such 
broad brushstrokes, however, obscures significant deviations from the west-
ernization narrative. Consider, for example, the abolition of discriminatory 
sodomy laws. At this particular point in history, it is true the countries that 
still criminalize sodomy are typically outside the Western world.153 However, 
the history of sodomy laws does not fit a neat unidirectional narrative 
about the West leading the way.
The United States is understood to be a paradigmatic component of the 
West. Yet, when the US Supreme Court finally struck down discriminatory sod-
omy laws in the 2003 case of Lawrence v. Texas, it was not at the vanguard of 
change.154 We can compare the United States with Asia. Twenty years prior to 
the Lawrence decision, Hong Kong’s government conducted a study of sodomy 
laws in Asia and found that “more countries in the region tolerate consensual 
homosexual conduct by adults in private than penalize it, and that character-
istically their legal systems only intervene where the homosexual activity in-
volves some additional element of force, abuse of the young, oppression, fraud, 
absence of consent, exploitation or occurrence in public.”155 Indeed, by the 
time Lawrence was decided, many Asian jurisdictions had already decriminal-
ized sodomy—or had never criminalized it in the first place.156 In addition to 
obscuring this fact about decriminalization, narratives about Western progres-
siveness obscure the fact that it was typically Western colonial governments 
that established the discriminatory sodomy laws in Asia, and elsewhere, that 
local human rights defenders later sought to repeal.157
The case of sodomy laws is only one of several illustrations of the western-
ization narrative’s flaws. Employment discrimination protections is another 
area in which the United States lags behinds many non-Western states. To 
date, the United States lacks nationwide protections against employment dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.158 Meanwhile, a 
non-negligible number of non-Western states have enacted such protections 
153   See Carroll & Mendos, supra note 60, at 37–39.
154   See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
155   Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Laws Governing Homosexual Conduct (Topic 2), at 
67–68 (1983), available at www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/publications/rhomosexual.htm.
156   See Holning Lau, “Grounding Conversations on Sexuality and Asian Law,” 44 U.C. Davis Law 
Review 773, 776–778 (2011).
157   See, e.g., Douglas E. Sanders, “377 and the Unnatural Afterlife of British Colonialism 
in Asia,” 4 Asian Journal of Comparative Law 1 (2009); Human Rights Watch, This Alien 
Legacy: The Origins of “Sodomy” Laws in British Colonialism (2008).
158   See discussion in supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
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against sexual orientation discrimination and sometimes gender identity dis-
crimination as well.159
Another challenge to the westernization narrative concerns constitutional 
protection against discrimination based on non-binary gender identities. The 
apex courts of Nepal, Pakistan, and India were early leaders in interpreting 
their constitutions to protect persons with non-binary gender identities.160 
Meanwhile, on the issue of marriage, we can contrast the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR), whose jurisdiction mostly covers Latin America.161 The ECtHR has 
held that the European Convention on Human Rights does not require mem-
ber states to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples.162 In contrast, the 
IACtHR based in Costa Rica has leaped ahead, holding that the Inter-American 
Convention on Human Rights requires states to grant marriage rights to same-
sex couples.163 Likewise, the IACtHR has stated that individuals have the right 
to be legally recognized in their gender identity based on self-determination,164 
whereas the ECtHR has allowed more onerous restrictions on the right to gen-
der recognition.165
159   See Carroll & Mendos, note 60, at 46–59. To be sure, Western jurisdictions as a whole have 
a higher rate of establishing such protections, but this generalization obscures details 
worth noting.
160   On Nepal, see 2 NJA Law Journal 261 (2008) (translating Pant et al. v. Nepal, Writ No. 917, 
21 December 2007). On India, see NaLSA, supra note 29. On Pakistan, see Sean Dickson & 
Steve Sanders, “India, Nepal, and Pakistan: A Unique South Asian Constitutional Discourse 
on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,” in Social Difference and Constitutionalism in 
Pan-Asia, at 340–344 (Susan H. Williams ed.) (Cambridge University Press 2013).
161   Many commentators do not consider Latin America to be a part of the so-called “West.” 
See, e.g., Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(Simon & Schuster 2011). Accordingly, recent developments in Latin America challenge 
assumptions that the Western world is always more advanced in protecting SOGI rights. 
Narratives about the development of SOGI rights are sometimes framed in terms of the 
Global North versus the Global South, with the assumption that SOGI rights travel from 
the former to the latter. Developments in Latin America challenge this assumption as 
well. See Katherine Brown & Catherine J. Nash, “Resisting LGBT Rights Where ‘We Have 
Won’: Canada and Great Britain,” 13 Journal of Human Rights 322 (2014).
162   Chapin & Charpentier v. France, ECtHR, No. 40183/07, 9 June 2016; Schalk and Kopf v. 
Austria, ECtHR, No. 30141/04, 24 June 2010.
163   Advisory Opinion No. 24/17, IACtHR, 24 November 2017.
164   Id. at paras. 85–171.
165   See A.P., Garçon & Nicot v. France, ECtHR, Nos. 79885/12, 52471/13, 52596/13, 6 March 
2017; Parry v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, No. 42971/05, 28 November 2016. See also Holning 
Lau, “Gender Recognition as Human Right,” in New Human Rights: Recognition, Novelty, 
Rhetoric (Andreas von Arnauld, Kerstin Odendahl & Mart Susi eds., forthcoming 2018), 
available at ssrn.com/abstract=3056110.
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Perpetuating flawed westernization narratives risks corrupting debates 
about law reform. For example, relying on the westernization narrative, op-
ponents of SOGI rights sometimes claim that non-Western parts of the world 
ought to reject SOGI rights to rebuke the West.166 Yet, these claims are prob-
lematic because SOGI rights transcend ties to the Western world. Non-Western 
parts of the world have drawn inspiration from a variety of sources, including 
indigenous ones, to support SOGI rights.167 Indeed, as discussed earlier, non-
Western jurisdictions have sometimes been more protective of SOGI rights 
than their Western counterparts.
Westernization narratives also undermine exchanges in the global market-
place of ideas by obscuring the fact that Western jurisdictions can learn from 
non-Western jurisdictions that have been leaders in protecting against SOGI 
discrimination. Various non-Western jurisdictions have been sites of knowl-
edge production related to SOGI rights and should be acknowledged as such. 
Scholars, including myself, have argued to Western audiences that courts out-
side of the West are generating perspectives that ought to be studied by other 
jurisdictions around the world.168 Sonia Katyal, for example, has argued that 
the Delhi High Court’s opinion striking down India’s sodomy law deserves at-
tention because it is more forward-looking than the United States’ decision 
in Lawrence.169 She noted that “The Delhi High Court’s Naz Foundation deci-
sion, although relying in part on Lawrence and other cases from the West, also 
transcended these decisions by relying on a wider host of non-Western juris-
dictions …”170 Moreover, the Naz Foundation decision “transcended Lawrence 
in powerful and lasting ways … reformed Lawrence by demonstrating its 
limitations.”171 Although a panel of the Indian Supreme Court eventually re-
versed the Delhi High Court in 2013,172 the Supreme Court has agreed to revisit 
its decision and seems positioned to vindicate the Delhi High Court’s earlier 
outcome.173
166   For acknowledgements and critiques of this claim, see e.g., Human Rights Watch, supra 
note 157; Lau, supra note 151, at 532–533; McGill, supra note 10, at 26–28; Stewart Chang, 
“Legacies of Exceptionalism and the Future of Gay Rights in Singapore,” 46 Hong Kong 
Law Journal 72, 80 (2016).
167   See Lau, supra note 151, at 519–527.
168   See, e.g., Sonia Katyal, “The Dissident Citizen,” 57 UCLA Law Review 1415 (2010); Holning 
Lau, “Marriage Equality and Family Diversity: Comparative Perspectives from the United 
States and South Africa,” 85 Fordham Law Review 2615 (2017).
169   Katyal, supra note 168, at 1457–1458.
170   Id. at 1457.
171   Id. at 1458.
172   See Koushal, supra note 147.
173   See supra note 149.
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Beyond the topic of sodomy, discussions about other issues similarly ben-
efit from moving beyond a westernization narrative. Jurists around the world 
should study South Africa’s case of Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, which 
made South Africa’s constitutional court the first national apex court in the 
world to hold that excluding same-sex couples from marriage is a constitution-
al violation.174 In previous writing, I have argued that Fourie ought not to be 
shadowed by Obergefell v. Hodges from United States because Fourie contains 
insights missing from the United States’ decision. On gender identity, govern-
ments around the world might look to Argentina, which blazed a trail when 
it became the first country in the world to allow transgender individuals to 
obtain new identity documents reflecting their gender identity without impos-
ing any medical requirements.175 The Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights later described Argentina’s approach as a best practice for advancing 
goals of nondiscrimination.176 Yet another example of non-Western jurisdic-
tions being at the vanguard is the protection of persons with non-binary gen-
der identities. As previously mentioned, the apex courts of Nepal, Pakistan, and 
India have all recognized and protected individuals who identify outside the 
male/female binary.177 At the very least, these jurisdictions unsettle assump-
tions that Western courts may have about the binary nature of sex and gender 
categories.178 In sum, certain parts of the non-Western world are advancing 
SOGI discrimination law in ways that warrant attention and careful study. Yet 
the overly simplistic narrative of westernization relegates these developments 
to the shadows.
V Drawbacks of SOGI Discrimination Protections
SOGI discrimination protections have prompted criticism, not only from so-
cial conservatives but also from progressive commentators who believe anti-
discrimination frameworks are too constraining. Because the critiques from 
social conservatives are likely already familiar to readers, this volume focuses 
174   Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC).
175   Gender Identity Act, No. 26,743 of 23 May 2012 (Argentina). See also Emily Schmall, 
“Transgender Advocates Applaud New Law in Argentina: Far-Reaching Measure Is One of 
World’s Most Liberal on Changing Sex,” International Herald Tribune, 26 May 26 2012, at 6.
176   Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR), Violence Against LGBTI 
Persons, at 222 (2015).
177   See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
178   See Holning Lau, “Law, Sexuality, and Transnational Perspectives,” 5 Drexel Law Review 
479, 485–486 (2013). Cf. also Dickson & Sanders, supra note 160, at 347 (“the decisions 
from India, Nepal, and Pakistan are fascinating decisions that rightfully occupy a promi-
nent place in the broader global movement for SOGI rights.”).
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instead on examining two critiques from commentators who are sympathetic 
to expanding SOGI rights but are wary of working within an antidiscrimination 
framework. The first criticism is that the SOGI antidiscrimination framework is 
overly assimilationist. Relatedly, the second criticism is that the antidiscrimi-
nation framework is overly identitarian. Drawing on comparative examples, I 
will contend that these criticisms ought to inform how—but not whether—
SOGI antidiscrimination projects are pursued.
V.A Critiques Concerning Assimilation
One progressive critique of antidiscrimination frameworks is that they too 
often focus on assimilating marginalized groups into existing legal and social 
institutions and, in so doing, might obscure the possibility of radically trans-
forming the institutions themselves. This critique has been made in a variety of 
contexts, but has been debated perhaps most hotly with respect to marriage.179 
Thus, this volume will focus its attention on the paradigmatic example of mar-
riage. Before exploring the critique, I will first surface the reasons why many 
people view same-sex marriage rights to be important.
For many people, extending marriage rights to same-sex couples is cru-
cial because denying same-sex couples the choice to marry perpetuates no-
tions that same-sex couples are somehow inferior to different-sex couples.180 
Granting same-sex couples the freedom to marry represents an acknowledge-
ment that same-sex couples are not second-class citizens. In addition, for 
many same-sex couples, getting married is a meaningful choice because it ex-
presses the couple’s commitment to each other and signals this commitment 
to the rest of society.181
Marriage also carries legal significance. For example, in the United States, 
thousands of legal provisions distribute rights and responsibilities based on 
whether a couple is married.182 The US Supreme Court noted that the gov-
ernment will treat a couple differently, based on whether they are married, 
for a wide range of issues—“taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of 
intestate succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; 
medical decision-making authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits 
179   For a seminal anti-assimilationist critique regarding marriage, see Paula L. Ettelbrick, 
“Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?,” Out/Look: National Gay & Lesbian 
Quarterly, Fall 1989, at 9. For anti-assimilationist critiques with respect to other contexts, 
see, e.g., Dean Spade, “Under the Cover of Gay Rights,” 37 NYU Review of Law & Social 
Change 79, 84–85 (2013).
180   See Suzanne Kim, “Toward Skeptical Marriage Equality,” 34 Harvard Journal of Law & 
Gender 37, 49–50 (2011).
181   Id. at 50–51.
182   See Obergefell, supra note 115, at 2601.
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of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign 
finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and 
child custody, support, and visitation rules” just to name a few.183
Critics, however, argue that pushing for same-sex marriage diverts atten-
tion from law reform that could be more transformative by protecting a broad 
range of caregiving relationships. For example, one might argue that cohabit-
ing adults who care for each other should have a variety of rights regardless of 
whether they are married.184 These rights might range from rights to take time 
off from work to care for each other during medical emergencies to divorce-
like dissolution rights when the relationship ends. Critics also argue that law 
reform should aim at better protecting individuals who are single.185 For ex-
ample, in the United States, many individuals rely on their spouse’s employer 
for health insurance. Commentators have pointed to this health care system 
as exemplifying the limitations of a legal regime that prioritizes marriage.186 
Focusing on expanding marriage rights arguably risks diverting resources from 
advocacy efforts to expand access to quality health care to all individuals re-
gardless of relationship status.
Moreover, there are additional philosophical reasons why individuals—gay 
or straight—may object to marriage.187 One might oppose the gendered roles 
and practices that are culturally (if not legally) associated with marriage, espe-
cially gendered roles within marriage that subordinate women. One might ob-
ject to the commercialization of the marriage industry. One might also believe 
that the culture of marriage is too conformist, the side effect of which is to stig-
matize adults who are unmarried. For such philosophical reasons, progressive 
commentators have critiqued efforts to assimilate same-sex couples into the 
institution of marriage instead of radically changing the privileged position of 
marriage in law and society.
Some commentators, however, have argued that marriage rights for same-
sex couples need not be mutually exclusive from skepticism toward marriage 
as an institution.188 Advocates can push for same-sex couples’ marriage rights 
 
183   Id.
184   See Kim, supra note 180, at 47.
185   Id.
186   See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, “Marriage and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State’s 
Regulation of Intimate Relationships Between Adults,” 30 Harvard Journal of Law & 
Gender 25, 55 (2007); Marth Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth, at 284–285 (New 
Press 2004).
187   See Kim, supra note 180, at 47.
188   See, e.g., Kim, supra note 180; Edward Stein, “Marriage or Liberation?: Reflections on Two 
Strategies in the Struggle for Lesbian and Gay Rights and Relationship Recognition,” 61 
Rutgers Law Review 567 (2009).
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while also supporting efforts to protect other family forms, such as civil part-
nership rights for couples who do not wish to marry. Indeed, the legalization 
of same-sex marriage might foster a culture of appreciating diverse fam-
ily forms, which may affect a range of families beyond same-sex couples. As 
Suzanne Kim put it: “The elimination of the legal barrier to entry into marriage 
for same-sex couples provides a powerful opportunity to project the value of 
pluralism.”189 Thus, legalizing same-sex marriage may set the stage for further 
reforms to family law.
Judicial opinions legalizing same-sex marriage vary in whether they adopt 
an assimilationist perspective or one that promotes family diversity and plu-
ralism. Juxtaposing the United States’ and South Africa’s landmark same-sex 
marriage opinions puts this contrast in sharp relief. Both apex courts held that 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage is unconstitutional.190 However, 
their respective decisions diverged in their conceptualization of marriage.191
In the case of Obergefell v. Hodges, the US Supreme Court suggested that get-
ting married confers dignity upon people. It stated that marriage “promise[s] 
nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life.” It also 
implied that unmarried individuals are to be pitied. According to Obergefell, 
“Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely person might call out 
only to find no one there.”192 As a result, being unmarried is “be[ing] condemned 
to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions.”193 
Obergefell is thus an opinion that centers on assimilating gays and lesbians into 
the institution of marriage. The opinion does not openly acknowledge the fact 
that, although marriage is indeed a good choice for many couples, it may not 
be the right choice for everyone.
In contrast to this uncritical embrace of marriage as an institution, the 
majority opinion in Fourie made clear that it is not marriage per se that 
confers dignity upon couples. Instead, it is the legal right to decide whether 
to marry—and whether to marry someone of the same sex—that is central to 
dignity. While Fourie acknowledged that many people find marriage to be ex-
tremely meaningful and important,194 it also openly acknowledged critiques 
189   Kim, supra note 180, at 42–46.
190   See Fourie, supra note 174; Obergefell, supra note 115.
191   I have written previously about this comparison at Lau, supra note 168.
192   Obergefell, supra note 115, at 2594. The majority opinion further glorified marriage by stat-
ing that “marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations…. [It is] fulfill-
ment in its highest meaning…. No union is more profound than marriage.” Id. at 2594, 
2602, 2608.
193   Id. at 2600.
194   Fourie, supra note 174, at paras. 63–72.
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of marriage.195 It recognized that some same-sex couples may reject marriage 
for philosophical and political reasons.196 Accordingly, it stated that “what is in 
issue is not the decision to be taken, but the choice that is available. If hetero-
sexual couples have the option of deciding whether to marry or not, so should 
same-sex couples have the choice.”197 Rather than denigrate the choice not to 
marry, the court openly recognized that South Africa has a “multitude of family 
formations”198 and is committed to “respect across difference.”199
Obergefell and Fourie illuminate that, in extending marriage rights to 
same-sex couples, court opinions can diverge in their relationships to anti-
assimilationist critiques. By situating dignity interests in the decision whether 
to marry, as opposed to situating dignity in marriage itself, the majority opin-
ion in Fourie avoids the assimilationist undertones of Obergefell’s majority 
opinion.200
V.B Critiques Concerning the Identitarianism Frame
Some progressive commentators are concerned that LGBT antidiscrimination 
claims reify socially constructed identity categories in problematic ways.201 In 
other words, LGBT antidiscrimination claims rest on the idea that LGBT per-
sons are being treated differently—either directly or indirectly—as compared 
with straight and cisgender counterparts. Articulating such claims about “LGBT 
persons” (or subgroups such as gay men or transgender persons) labels people 
based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. The appropriateness of 
such labeling has been debated.
The critique about identitarianism is particularly acute where LGBT iden-
tity is a relatively new cultural development. For example, individuals who are 
sexually intimate with members of the same sex do not always form identi-
ties around that intimacy by calling oneself “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” or any 
195   Id. at para. 72.
196   Id.
197   Id.
198   Id. at para. 59.
199   Id. at para. 60.
200   While I have focused on this case study of same-sex marriage in the United States and 
South Africa, other commentators have pointed to other examples illustrating that judi-
cial vindication of SOGI nondiscrimination rights can reflect varying degrees of assimi-
lationism. See, e.g., Dickson & Sanders, supra note 160 (“the path of SOGI rights in South 
Asia forms a counterpoint to the current Western model of legal and social advocacy for 
LGBT rights, which promotes narratives of similarity and assimilation over those of diver-
sity or the forthright embrace of sexual difference and gender variation.”).
201   See supra notes 205–208 and accompanying text.
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such identifier.202 In some parts of the world, thinking about homosexuality in 
terms of identity is a more recent cultural development than it is in the West.203 
For example, ethnographers have suggested that, until the past two decades or 
so, individuals in Iran who engaged in same-sex intimacy almost never identi-
fied themselves as gay, homosexual, or members of any such identity category.204 
Exploring such recent examples puts in stark relief the cultural contingency 
of gay identities. There is thus worry about articulating human rights in 
terms of protecting gay people from discrimination. As scholars such as Jena 
McGill have noted, requiring an individual to “come out” as gay (or lesbian, 
bisexual, or transgender) to claim nondiscrimination rights will feel very 
foreign in places where men who are attracted to men tend not to describe 
themselves with identity labels based on sexual attraction; moreover, their an-
tidiscrimination claims are unlikely to resonate with the others in their cul-
tural surroundings.205
Even in the West, there are concerns about framing rights claims in terms 
of LGBT identities. Commentators worry that rights movements centered 
on LGBT identities focus too much on presenting a unified front, essential-
izing LGBT identities and obscuring diversity within LGBT communities.206 
When such internal diversity is obscured, it is the views and priorities of rel-
atively privileged LGBT persons that may eclipse those of other community 
members.207 Commentators have also argued that social and legal reform 
movements should seek to avoid reifying LGBT identity; instead, the reforms 
should aim at reducing the social salience of LGBT identities because pigeon-
holing people into identity categories is stifling.208
202   See, e.g., Edward O. Laumann et al., The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices 
in the United States, at 299 fig. 8.2 (University of Chicago Press 1994).
203   See McGill, supra note 10, at 29–30.
204   See, Pardis Mahdavi, “Questioning the Global Gays(ze): Constructions of Sexual Identities 
in Post-Revolution Iran,” 18 Social Identities 223, 225–231 (2012) (presenting ethnographic 
fieldwork conducted in Iran between 2000 and 2007).
205   McGill, supra note 10, at 29–30 (building on the research of scholars such as Rajesh Dhir, 
Peter Drucker, Joseph Massad, Hassan El Menyawi, Sonia Katyal, Rosalind Morris, and 
Shannon Woodcock).
206   For related critiques of LGBT identity politics, see, e.g., Mary Bernstein, “Identity Politics,” 
31 Annual Review of Sociology 47, 56 (2005); Joshua Gamson, “Must Identity Movements 
Self-Destruct?: A Queer Dilemma,” in Queer Theory Sociology, at 395, 409–411 (Steven 
Seidman ed.) (Wiley-Blackwell 1996); Gwendolyn M. Leachman, “Institutionalizing 
Essentialism: Mechanisms of Intersectional Subordination with the LGBT Movement,” 
2016 Wisconsin Law Review 655 (2016).
207   See Leachman, supra note 206, at 656–661.
208   See Bernstein, supra note 206, at 56; Gamson, supra note 206, at 409–411. In addition to 
being concerned about identity labels such as “gay” and “lesbian,” some commentators 
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To avoid the identitarian nature of antidiscrimination claims, one might 
frame rights claims in terms of liberty interests (such as freedom, autonomy, 
and privacy) as opposed to nondiscrimination. For example, efforts to de-
criminalize sodomy between men can emphasize the universal right to sexual 
autonomy, as opposed to gay men’s right to nondiscrimination. Likewise, ef-
forts to secure same-sex couples’ access to marriage can be framed in terms 
of the universal freedom to marry, as opposed to gays’ and lesbians’ right to 
nondiscrimination.
Asserting these liberty claims alone, without articulating nondiscrimination 
rights, may well feel unsatisfying.209 In many parts of the world, people’s lived 
experiences are shaped by SOGI identity categories. To call out and condemn 
discrimination against minority identity groups has expressive value; vindicat-
ing nondiscrimination rights helps destigmatize those groups. Vindication of 
identity-based antidiscrimination rights may also have valuable precedential 
effects. For example, when a court strikes down a sodomy law on discrimina-
tion grounds, it affirms a nondiscrimination principle that can shape subse-
quent cases if the jurisdiction adheres to precedents. Courts may later apply 
that nondiscrimination principle to cases concerning issues such as partner-
ship and marriage rights. In contrast, striking down the law based on privacy 
grounds may not have the same downstream effects. Identity-based claims 
have also been a powerful tool for fostering solidarity and mobilization in so-
cial justice movements in various parts of the world.210
Anti-identitarian critiques of the LGBT nondiscrimination framework can 
be ameliorated by raising awareness that LGBT identities are diverse and con-
tingent on time and place. Indeed, in the United States, the LGBT rights move-
ment of the 1970s purposefully emphasized internal diversity in its campaigns; 
it did so to a greater extent than it has in more recent decades.211 Advocates can 
recalibrate their campaigns to again more purposefully portray the diversity 
have raised concerns about elevating the significance of “sexual orientation” and “gender 
identity” as identity categories. See, e.g., Matthew Waites, “Critique of ‘Sexual Orientation’ 
and ‘Gender Identity’ in Human Rights Discourse: Global Queer Politics Beyond the 
Yogyakarta Principles,” 15 Contemporary Politics 137, 143 (2009).
209   For related arguments about the unsatisfactory nature of using non-identitarian claims to 
advance racial justice, see, e.g., Osamudia R. James, “Valuing Identity,” 102 Minnesota Law 
Review 127 (2017).
210   See, e.g., Gamson, supra note 206, at 396 (discussing gay identity politics in the United 
States); Mahdavi, supra note 204, at 231–234 (describing gay identity politics in Iran).
211   See Leachman, supra note 206, at 670–672, citing Elizabeth A. Armstrong, Forging Gay 
Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco (University of Chicago Press 2002).
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within LGBT communities. Put differently, LGBT rights advocates can avoid 
essentialism by cultivating a “thinner” construction of LGBT identity.212
In earlier writing, I have noted that various interpretations of gay identi-
ty have emerged around the world.213 For example, in Asia, “[b]eing gay has 
taken on different cultural meanings in places like Mumbai, Hong Kong, Seoul, 
and Taipei.”214 Exercising agency as informed cultural consumers, local actors 
have taken notions of gay identity that became popularized in the West and 
reshaped those identities by injecting them with local cultural sensibilities.215 
Recognizing this hybridity ameliorates concerns that LGBT rights discourse 
is imperialistic in nature, whereby Western notions of LGBT identity simply 
displace local cultural conceptions of sexual orientation and gender identity. 
Some scholars have described this hybridity in terms of a “queer diaspora”216 to 
explain that SOGI minorities around the world share commonalities, yet also 
represent a “contestation of a unitary GLBT identity” because the identity var-
ies across the world.217
VI Exemptions from SOGI Discrimination Bans
Some of the most high-profile debates about SOGI discrimination protections 
now center on the question of exemptions: Under what circumstances, if ever, 
should there be exemptions from SOGI discrimination bans? To some extent, 
the idea of exemptions seems uncontroversial. Exemptions have long existed, 
and have gone largely unchallenged, in other realms of discrimination law. For 
example, it seems relatively uncontroversial to say that churches should be ex-
empt from sex discrimination bans, such that they can refuse to hire female 
ministers if their religion requires such sex discrimination. Likewise, advocates 
of SOGI rights usually accept that churches should be exempt from SOGI dis-
crimination bans, such that they can refuse to ordain openly LGBT ministers.
Some controversies concerning exemptions extend across a range of dis-
crimination grounds. For example, there is debate about how broadly to define 
212   Daniel Ortiz explained that a “thin” conception of gay identity views gay people as “simply 
those who experience same-sex desire—no more and no less”; in contrast, a “thick” con-
ception “describes gay people primarily in terms of their social roles and their relation-
ship to other features of social life.” Daniel R. Ortiz, “Creating Controversy: Essentialism 
and Constructivism and the Politics of Gay Identity,” 79 Virginia Law Review 1833, 1845 
(1993).
213   Lau, supra note 156, at 800.
214   Id.
215   Lau, supra note 151, at 523–525.
216   Katyal, supra note 168, at 1429 (building on the works of Simon Watney and others).
217   Id.
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what counts as a religious entity for the purpose of ministerial exceptions in 
employment discrimination law.218 For example, consider the question: is a 
teacher employed by a religious school protected by discrimination laws, or is 
the teacher’s position subject to a ministerial exception? This question is rele-
vant regardless of whether the teacher claims that she is discriminated against 
based on sexual orientation or gender identity, or any other protected category 
such as sex, race, disability, or religion.
It is beyond the scope of this volume to examine general debates about 
exemptions that apply across a range of protected categories. Instead, this 
section will examine two debates that have flared up in the context of SOGI 
rights, specifically in relation to same-sex marriage. The following section will 
examine exemptions for civil marriage celebrants who object to officiating 
same-sex marriages. Afterwards, the next section will examine exemptions for 
private businesses that invoke religion to justify discrimination. A number of 
countries around the world have grappled with these areas of dispute. As this 
volume goes to press, several pieces of pending litigation on such exemptions 
remain unresolved. Lawyers and scholars who work in the field of SOGI dis-
crimination law are closely following these legal disputes.
VI.A Exemptions for Civil Marriage Officiants
As a growing number of jurisdictions extend marriage to same-sex couples, 
they must grapple with whether to grant exemptions to marriage officiants 
(also known as marriage celebrants) who object to same-sex marriage on 
religious grounds. It has been relatively uncontroversial for governments to 
say that religious ministers are not obligated to officiate same-sex marriages. 
Greater controversy has surrounded proposals to exempt civil servants who of-
ficiate marriages or are otherwise involved in helping couples to marry. In many 
jurisdictions, government employees—such as clerks, registrars, judges, and 
magistrates—have job duties that include involvement in marriage 
proceedings.219 There have been heated debates over granting these civil 
 servants the ability to refuse providing their government services to same-sex 
couples based on their religious beliefs. Indeed, some jurisdictions have passed 
laws to grant such exemptions to civil servants. Notably, these civil servants do 
218   See generally Pamela Slotte & Helge Årsheim, “The Ministerial Exception—Comparative 
Perspectives,” 4 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion 171 (2015).
219   Civil servants are sometimes involved in marriage proceedings even if they do not offici-
ate the marriage. For example, in the United States, one civil servant (e.g., a clerk) may be 
responsible for processing a couple’s marriage license and then another civil servant (e.g., 
a judge) may be responsible for officiating (also known as solemnizing) the marriage. In 
this section of the volume, however, I will focus on the paradigmatic case of civil marriage 
officiants.
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not work for a religious entity, nor are they acting in any official religious ca-
pacity when they officiate marriages. Yet the exemptions allow them to recuse 
themselves from serving same-sex couples who seek civil marriage.
To be sure, many jurisdictions have debated and then rejected the idea of 
granting civil marriage officiants exemptions. The national governments of 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom are recent examples.220 In some other 
jurisdictions, laws have been created to exempt civil servants. One type of ex-
emption system allows civil servants to refuse to provide same-sex couples with 
marriage-related services while continuing to service different-sex couples. This 
system has been adopted in a range of jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, 
South Africa, and the states of Mississippi and Utah in the United States.
The Netherlands was the first county in the world to legalize same-sex mar-
riage. Dutch lawmakers legalized same-sex marriage without being ordered to 
do so by a constitutional court, and allowing exemption for civil servants was 
a pragmatic compromise.221 Although the exemptions were once widely sup-
ported by the Dutch public, over time, there was growing criticism that the 
exemptions were unfair toward same-sex couples.222 In 2014, the Dutch legis-
lature passed a law to preclude any new civil marriage officiants from receiving 
an exemption.223
In South Africa, the Constitutional Court was the first national apex court 
to hold that depriving same-sex couples of marriage is unconstitutional.224 
The Court, however, did not order the government to register same-sex mar-
riages right away. Instead, the Court gave the South African Parliament one 
year to finalize legislative reform to legalize same-sex marriage.225 As a result, 
Parliament passed legislation that extended marriage rights to same-sex cou-
ples, but also granted civil servants an exemption if they object to performing 
220   See Stijn Smet, “The Problem of a Same Sex Marriage Exemption for Civil Celebrants,” 
Pursuit, 29 November 2017, pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/the-problem-of-a-same-sex- 
marriage-exemption-for-civil-celebrants.
221   See Stijn Smet, “Conscientious Objection to Same-sex Marriages: Beyond the Limits of 
Toleration,” 11 Religion & Human Rights 114 (2016).
222   Id.
223   Id. at 116, citing Wet van 4 juli 2014 tot wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de 
Algemene wet gelijke behandeling met betrekking tot ambtenaren van de burgerlijke 
stand die onderscheid maken als bedoeld in de Algemene wetgelijke behandeling [Act of 
4 July 2014 amending the Civil Code and the General Act on equal treatment, with regards 
to civil servants who treat persons differently in terms of the General Act on equal treat-
ment], Staatsblad 2014 260.
224   See Fourie, supra note 174, at para. 114.
225   Id.
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same-sex marriages based on conscience.226 The president’s office eventually 
signed this law into effect. Scholars and LGBT rights advocates have criticized 
South Africa’s exemptions for civil marriage officials for being unconstitution-
al, arguing that the exemptions impermissibly discriminate against same-sex 
couples.227 Advocates have not, however, challenged the exemptions in court 
because they have chosen to devote their limited resources to other issues, 
such as combatting hate crimes.228
Meanwhile, advocates have in fact chosen to challenge the exemptions for 
civil marriage officiants in Mississippi.229 The state of Mississippi created an 
exemption for civil marriage officiants after the US Supreme Court’s decision 
in Obergefell led to the legalization of same-sex marriage in that state.230 At the 
time of writing this volume, the litigation in Mississippi is still pending.231 Like 
Mississippi, the state of Utah also allows government employees to exempt 
themselves from performing same-sex marriages.232 It is worth noting that the 
226   See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, Sec. 6. For an elaboration on the compromise embodied by 
the Civil Union Act, see David Bilchitz with Melanie Judge, “The Civil Union Act: Messy 
Compromise or Giant Leap Forward?,” in To Have and To Hold: The Making of Same-Sex 
Marriage in South Africa, at 149 (Melanie Judge et al. eds.) (Jacana Media 2009); Lau, supra 
note 116, at 300–301.
227   E.g., Pierre de Vos, “The ‘Inevitability’ of Same-Sex Marriage in South Africa’s Post-
Apartheid State,” 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 432, 463 (2007).
228   See Lau, supra note 116, at 300.
229   See Zakiya Summers, “ACLU of MS Responds to Supreme Court’s Refusal to Hear HB 
1523 Challenge,” ACLU of Mississippi, 9 January 2018, www.aclu-ms.org/en/news/
aclu-ms-responds-supreme-courts-refusal-hear-hb-1523-challenge.
230   Mississippi’s exemptions for civil marriage officiants is embedded in a law that also pro-
vides legal immunity to other actors (e.g., businesses, landlords, adoption agencies) that 
discriminate based on religious or moral opposition to same-sex marriage. See Protecting 
Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act (commonly referred to as 
HB 1523), Ch. 334, 2016 Miss. Laws 427 (codified at Miss. Code Ann. Secs. 11-62-1 to -19 
(2017)). See also Mark Joseph Stern, “Mississippi’s Uniquely Cruel Anti-LGBTQ Law May 
Be Heading to the Supreme Court,” Slate, 2 October 2017, 1:40 PM, www.slate.com/blogs/
outward/2017/10/02/mississippi_s_hb_1523_may_be_heading_to_the_supreme_court.
html (describing Mississippi’s law as “a direct response to Obergefell….”).
231   The US Supreme Court has declined to review an appellate court ruling that plaintiffs 
lacked standing to challenge Mississippi’s religious exemptions law, HB 1523. The ACLU 
of Mississippi has stated, however, they intend to proceed with their narrower lawsuit 
that challenges only the portion of HB 1523 that concerns civil marriage officiants. See 
Summers, supra note 229.
232   Protections for Religious Expression and Beliefs about Marriage, Family, or Sexuality, 
2015 Utah S.B. 297, codified as Utah Code Ann. 1953 Secs. 17-20-4, 30-1-6, 63G-20-103, 
63G-20-202 (West 2015). See also Nicholas J. Schilling Jr., “Analysis of Statutory Religious 
Accommodations for State-Employed Religious Objectors to Same-sex Marriage 
Solemnization,” 31 Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 431, 448–450 (2017).
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laws in Mississippi and Utah both require government offices to ensure that 
all same-sex couples who seek to marry are able to do so despite the recusal of 
individual civil officiants.233
The state of North Carolina allows government employees to recuse them-
selves from performing same-sex marriages if doing so conflicts with their 
sincerely held religious beliefs.234 North Carolina also requires that there is 
someone within each local jurisdiction of North Carolina who is willing to 
perform same-sex marriages.235 North Carolina’s situation differs from that 
of Mississippi and Utah in at least two ways. First, government officials in 
North Carolina cannot choose to recuse themselves from performing same-
sex marriages alone. Instead, they must recuse themselves from performing 
all marriages.236 For example, magistrate judges are authorized to serve as cel-
ebrants in North Carolina; if a judge wishes to recuse herself from performing 
same-sex marriages, she must recuse herself from performing all marriages. 
The judge would continue to oversee other judicial matters, but would not of-
ficiate any marriages. Second, North Carolina differs from Mississippi and Utah 
because it allows civil servants to be exempt from performing any type of mar-
riage based on religious beliefs, not only same-sex marriages.237 Thus, a magis-
trate judge who holds a religious objection to interracial marriages may recuse 
herself from officiating all marriages. These two aspects of North Carolina’s law 
ameliorate some of the discriminatory aspects of other exemptions schemes. 
Critics, however, still contend that North Carolina’s exemption system is dis-
criminatory, relegating same-sex couples to second-class citizenship.238
233   Utah’s law requires each county in Utah to ensure that someone is available in the coun-
ty to perform legal marriages for same-sex couples; this person may be a government 
employee or religious celebrant to whom the county can refer same-sex couples. See 
Schilling, supra note 232, at 449. The Mississippi law requires relevant government enti-
ties to ensure that authorization, licensing, solemnization, and performance “of any le-
gally valid marriage is not impeded or delayed as a result of any recusal.” Miss. Code Ann. 
Sec. 11-62-5(8)(a)–(b).
234   An Act to Allow Magistrates, Assistant Registers of Deeds, and Deputy Registers of Deeds 
to Recuse Themselves From Performing Duties Related to Marriage Ceremonies Due to 
Sincerely Held Religious Objection (commonly referred to as SB2), 2015 N.C. Session Law 
75. See also Schilling, supra note 232, at 446–448.
235   See Schilling, supra note 232, at 447–448.
236   Id. at 447.
237   Id. at 446.
238   See “Anti-LGBT Bill SB2 Becomes Law in NC,” Campaign for Southern Equality, south-
ernequality.org/sb2-becomes-law-in-nc. Advocates have sued to challenge the constitu-
tionality of SB2, but courts have ruled that plaintiffs in the lawsuit lacked standing. Ansley 
v. Warren, No. 1:16-cv-00054, 2016 WL 5213937 (W.D.N.C., 20 September 2016), affirmed by 
861 F.3d 512 (4th Cir. 2017). See also “Plaintiffs respond to 4th Circuit ruling on SB2, North 
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Some jurisdictions have sought to strike compromises through what can be 
termed “grandfather clauses.” For example, when the Netherlands passed leg-
islation to eliminate exemptions for civil marriage celebrants, the elimination 
of exemptions only applied to new civil celebrants.239 Civil celebrants who had 
already been granted exemptions were allowed to retain those exemptions. 
Similarly, Australia’s marriage equality legislation created a grandfather clause. 
When Australia legalized same-sex marriage, the government allowed existing 
civil celebrants to become classified as “religious celebrants” who are exempt 
from performing same-sex marriages for religious reasons, even though they 
are not religious ministers.240 This classification, however, was only available 
to existing civil celebrants.241 Going forward, religious exemptions in Australia 
will only be granted to religious ministers, as opposed to lay persons who ob-
ject to same-sex marriage for religious reasons.
VI.B Exemptions for Businesses
Another hotly debated issue is the appropriateness of granting exemptions to 
private businesses that wish to discriminate based on sexual orientation for re-
ligious reasons. This section will examine developments in two jurisdictions—
the United States and the United Kingdom—where this issue remains 
unsettled and is quickly evolving.
In the United States, the recently decided Supreme Court case of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission has garnered widespread 
 attention.242 The case concerned a bakery in Colorado named Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, which refused to design and create a wedding cake for two men 
because of the owner’s religious opposition to same-sex marriage.243 The two 
men, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, argued that the bakery’s refusal of service 
violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act,244 which prohibits businesses 
Carolina ‘Magistrate Recusal’ Law,” Campaign for Southern Equality, southernequality.org/
plaintiffs-respond-4th-circuit-ruling-sb2-north-carolina-magistrate-recusal-law.
239   See Smet, supra note 221, at 130.
240   “Marriage Equality in Australia,” Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, 
www.ag.gov.au/marriageequality. For background information about Australia’s civil 
marriage celebrant system, see Becky Batagol, “Why There Should Be No Room in the 
Law for Celebrants to Discriminate on Same-sex Marriage,” Conversation, 17 November 
2017, theconversation.com/why-there-should-be-no-room-in-the-law-for-celebrants-to-
discriminate-on-same-sex-marriage-87590.
241   “Marriage Equality in Australia,” supra note 240.
242   Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. __ (2018) (slip 
opinion).
243   Id. at 3–4.
244   Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), Secs. 24-34-301 to -804, CRS 2014.
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from discriminating based on sexual orientation. In response, the bakery’s 
owner, Jack Phillips, countered that enforcing the nondiscrimination provision 
against him would violate his constitutional freedom of religion. He also argued 
that any state action requiring him to create the cake would violate his consti-
tutional right to free expression by forcing him to express support for same-
sex marriage. In essence, the baker claimed an exemption from the Colorado 
Anti-Discrimination Act. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the 
Colorado Court of Appeal both ruled in favor of the same-sex couple.245 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed in favor of the baker on very narrow 
grounds, leaving unresolved larger questions about whether businesses can be 
exempt from laws that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination.246
The Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop hinged on circum-
stances that were very specific to the case. According to the Court, the Colorado 
Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was marred by “a clear 
and impermissible hostility” toward Mr. Phillips’ sincere religious beliefs.247 
For example, the Court noted that one Commissioner disparaged Mr. Phillips’ 
religious position by calling it “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric 
that people can use.”248 The Court ultimately concluded that the Commission 
deprived Mr. Phillips of an impartial hearing in violation of his right to free re-
ligious exercise. The Court emphasized, however, that cases with facts similar 
to Masterpiece Cakeshop may well reach a different outcome if they are not 
marred by the procedural flaws in Masterpiece Cakeshop.249 Indeed, the major-
ity opinion contained soaring dicta suggesting that businesses usually should 
not be permitted to invoke religion to excuse themselves from discrimination 
laws. The Court noted that it is appropriate to exempt clergy, so that they are 
not compelled to perform marriage ceremonies for same-sex couples, but ex-
emptions ought to be confined: “it is a general rule that such [religious and 
philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and other actors in 
the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods 
and services.”250 Within days after the Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion, a state court in Arizona cited the dicta in Masterpiece Cakeshop to sup-
port its ruling that a business selling wedding stationary and décor may not 
245   See Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 242, at 8–9.
246   Id. at 18.
247   Id. at 12.
248   Id. at 13–14.
249   Id. at 18.
250   Id. at 9.
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invoke religion to reject clients based on sexual orientation.251 Advocates and 
scholars are watching closely to see whether more courts will eventually cite 
Masterpiece Cakeshop as this Arizona court has.
Across the Atlantic, another case involving a cake shop is still pending.252 The 
Northern Ireland case of Lee v. McArthur and Ashers Baking Company Limited 
concerns a gay man, Gareth Lee, who ordered a cake from Ashers Bakery. He 
requested that the cake bear the logo of an LGBT organization and the slo-
gan “Support Gay Marriage.” The owners of the bakery, Mr. and Mrs. McArthur, 
cancelled the order and refunded Mr. Lee his deposit. Based on their religious 
beliefs, they stated that they oppose same-sex marriage and the prospect of its 
legalization in Northern Ireland. The county court and Northern Ireland Court 
of Appeal both sided with Mr. Lee, ruling that the bakery violated Northern 
Ireland’s laws253 prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation as 
well as political opinion. Although Mr. Lee was not discriminated against based 
on his personal sexual orientation, the slogan he requested is associated with 
homosexuality and, thus, the case involved associative discrimination based 
on sexual orientation. The McArthurs argued that requiring them to make the 
cake would violate their rights to religion and free expression enshrined in 
the European Convention of Human Rights, but courts thus far have rejected 
those contentions. McArthur v. Lee is now pending before the UK Supreme 
Court.
It is worth noting that the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal had relied in 
part on the earlier UK Supreme Court case of Bull v. Hall, which will likely 
influence the Supreme Court’s deliberation on the pending bakery case.254 In 
Bull v. Hall, the Supreme Court ruled that a pair of hotel owners could not jus-
tify discrimination against a same-sex couple based on the owners’ religious 
beliefs. The Supreme Court held that prohibiting the hotel owners from dis-
crimination did not disproportionately restrict the hotel owners’ freedom of 
religion.
The cases from the United States and the United Kingdom highlight how the 
law concerning religious exemptions is still under development.255 Ongoing 
disputes in this area of law may ultimately affect not only sexual orientation 
251   See Brush & Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix, Arizona Court of Appeals, No. CV2016-05225, 7 
June 2018 (bench opinion).
252   See Lee v. McArthur, [2016] NICA (Civ), at 5 (Northern Ireland).
253   Equality Act (Sexual Orientation Regulations) 2006 (Northern Ireland); Fair Employment 
and Treatment Order 1998 (Northern Ireland).
254   Bull v. Hall [2013] UKSC 73.
255   Lower courts in other countries have also been grappling with this issue. For a discus-
sion of related cases from Canada and Australia, as well the United States and the United 
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discrimination but discrimination on other grounds as well. For example, if 
the UK Supreme Court rules that Ashers Bakery is exempt for religious rea-
sons, it may pave the way for other businesses to refuse providing wedding-
related services based on religious objections not only to same-sex marriage, 
but also other types of marriage. For instance, a wedding caterer might invoke 
religious objections to refuse providing services to an interfaith couple or an 
interracial couple. Indeed, pending court cases about religious exemptions 
raise the specter of widely opening the door to exemptions, which is a cause of 
concern for equality advocates.
 Conclusion
This volume has examined five major questions concerning the develop-
ment of SOGI discrimination law: (1) Is SOGI discrimination encompassed 
by existing laws that prohibit discrimination based on sex? (2) Should sexual 
orientation and gender identity be considered protected categories in and of 
themselves? (3) Is there a standard sequence for developing legal protections 
against SOGI discrimination? (4) What are the drawbacks of developing SOGI 
discrimination protections? (5) To what extent should religious objections jus-
tify exemptions from SOGI discrimination bans?
There are numerous benefits to approaching these questions from a com-
parative perspective. First, there is value in cross-fertilization of ideas. For 
example, although the UN Human Rights Committee stated early on that 
sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination, domestic 
courts—especially in the United States—subsequently developed the logical 
underpinnings of that claim. Comparative analysis also illuminates competing 
approaches to SOGI issues. For instance, jurisdictions that are grappling with 
the question of same-sex marriage can see, through comparative analysis, that 
there is more than one way to legalize same-sex marriage. Different countries 
have taken different approaches with potentially different downstream ef-
fects. Comparative study of SOGI discrimination is also useful because looking 
abroad can help to unsettle certain assumptions that may hinder domestic de-
liberations on SOGI discrimination rights. For example, studying South Asian 
jurisprudence that recognizes a third sex might help to unsettle assumptions 
within other jurisdictions that binary male/female categories are natural as 
opposed to social constructs.
Kingdom, see Mel Cousins, “Sexual Orientation, Equal Treatment and the Right to 
Manifest Religion: Lee v McArthur,” 28 King’s Law Journal 425, 436–441 (2017).
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Indeed, comparative study of SOGI discrimination is fruitful in a variety of 
ways. The short list of ways provided here is not intended to be exhaustive. 
Indeed this volume serves as a springboard for further research and discussion 
about comparative SOGI discrimination law.
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Human history is marked by group and individual struggles for emancipation, 
equality and self-expression. This first volume in the Brill Research Perspectives 
in Comparative Discrimination Law briefly explores some of the history under-
lying these efforts in the field of discrimination law. A broad discussion of the 
historical development of issues of discrimination is first set out, looking at 
certain international, regional and national bases for modern discrimination 
legal structures. Several of the theoretical frameworks invoked in a compara-
tive discrimination law analysis are then addressed, either as institutional 
frameworks or theories addressing specific protection grounds. This first vol-
ume is dedicated to setting out an introduction to the field of comparative 
discrimination law to give the reader a platform from which to undertake fur-
ther reading and research in the compelling topic of comparative discrimina-
tion law.
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Non-discrimination is a fundamental principle of international human rights 
law. This volume discusses the international legal framework on this princi-
ple and comparatively elaborates the definition of discrimination as well as 
the grounds of discrimination in the various general and specialised interna-
tional human rights treaties, including the International Labour Organisation 
conventions. The element of special measures as an integral aspect of this 
principle is also raised. A comparative discussion on the incorporation of in-
ternational standards on the principle of non-discrimination established in 
the international treaties in regional as well as national human rights frame-
works is also set forth to provide practical illustrations of the application of 
these standards in more specific and localised perspectives. Selected regional 
frameworks discussed are the African, American and European human rights 
regional frameworks and the national frameworks are South Africa and Brazil.
Comparative Discrimination Law; Age as a  
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This comparative review of age as a protected ground in discrimination law 
explores the underpinning questions and themes related to two main dimen-
sions of age discrimination. The first dimension is structural, economic and 
labour market driven, whereby age is used to allocate a range of rights, obliga-
tions and benefits within society. The second is the social justice and equality 
dimension, in which age is understood as an aspect of individual identity that 
is worthy of protection against indignity or detriment. The review then consid-
ers the law on age discrimination in a number of jurisdictions, the EU law, the 
UK, Sweden, USA, Canada and South Africa, and assesses the extent to which 
the underpinning questions explain the developing case law.
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